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Abstract   
This paper analyzes the Korean bank restructuring process that started in 
the wake of its currency crisis of 1997.  Korea suffered a heavy currency 
crisis that was accompanied, if not caused, by acute shortage of dollar 
liquidity of Korean banks.  The currency crisis was essentially banking 
crisis.   
This paper covers topics such as the scheme of capital injection to 
weak banks, nationalization of insolvent institutions, and setting up a 
strong financial restructuring agency.  Structural problem as well as 
liquidity problem in banks’ balance sheets became serious as the currency 
crisis deepened.  On April 14, 1998, the Government announced the basic 
restructuring framework aiming to stabilize financial markets.  The 
government’s restructuring framework included capital injection to 
financial institutions, mergers and/or closing down of banks, and asset sales. 
Regulatory institutions, such as the Korea Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO), the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and Financial 
Supervisory Commission (FSC) were also reorganized or newly created 
around 1997 and 1998.   
Bank restructuring in Korea, after all, in the aftermath of the Asian 
currency crisis is almost over. The focus of government-led bank 
restructuring is now shifted to create market-oriented reform, to ensure 
peace-time operation, and to strengthen Korean banks so that Korea will no 
longer have financial crisis.  It should be pointed out that decisive actions 
with massive public funds to restructure the financial sector in crisis are 
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1.   Introduction 
This paper analyzes the Korean bank restructuring process that started in the 
wake of its currency crisis of 1997.  Korea suffered a heavy currency crisis 
that was accompanied, if not caused, by acute shortage of dollar liquidity of 
Korean banks.  The currency crisis was essentially banking crisis.  In the 
wake of the currency crisis, the economy suffered a severe recession, and loan 
quality quickly deteriorated, making it necessary for the government to carry 
out a radical restructuring of the banking sector.  This paper covers topics 
such as the scheme of capital injection to weak banks, nationalization of 
insolvent institutions, and setting up a strong financial restructuring agency.  
Although Korean bank restructuring was not easy and certainly costly from a 
macroeconomic point of view, the crisis was basically over by 2002.1  T h e  
banking sector with the fewer institutions is on its way to recovery, as the 
economy as a whole is also making a strong recovery.  In anticipation of 
concluding remarks, decisive actions with massive public funds to restructure 
the financial sector in crisis will make a strong recovery possible in the 
medium term.2   
 
Prior to the crisis, Korea was anticipated to have a well-functioning banking 
system that channeled ample domestic saving into investment that was 
carried out by chaebols, large conglomerates.3 By any measure, Korea’s 
economic performance had been impressive prior to the Asian currency crisis.  
After achieving high economic growth for decades, Korea has become one of 
                                                  
1  Based on 160 previous episodes of currency crises from 1970 to 1995, Park and Lee (2002) find that a 
V-shaped recovery of real GDP growth following a crisis was not unique to the East Asian Countries, 
although the East Asia experienced a far sharper contraction and recovery. This fact attributed to more 
severe liquidity crises and weaker corporate and bank balance sheets. 
2  As described in Haggard (2001), the evidence from East Asia suggests that adopting a temporary 
top-down style supervisory body was necessary because corporations and banks moved slowly to 
restructure outstanding debt, in the hope that economic recovery would obviate the need for write-offs 
for bank or the surrender of equity control. However, few firms were prematurely liquidated, in part 
because a working bankruptcy regime was often not in place.     
3  The financial condition at the onset of crisis, the recurring pattern of corporate problems and 
restructuring of chaebols during the crisis period are documented in, for example, Krueger and Yoo 
(2002) and Mako (2002).   3
the leading industrial countries by mid-1990s. As shown in the figure below, 
the GDP growth rate was above 6% for decades until the end of 1996. In 
December 1996, Korea became the second Asian member of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).   
 
Immediately after the floatation of the Thai baht in July 1997, the Korean 
economy was not significantly affected.  The depreciation of the Won up to 
mid-October was rather limited. No warning from the IMF or the World Bank 
was issued. There was complacency among international organizations as 
well as officials in Seoul that the country would recover from the currency 
crisis which had overwhelmed Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.     
 
Figure 1-1
































However, the crisis spread to Korea suddenly. The won began to fall in late 
October 1997, when Kia, one of the three major automakers belonging to one of 
the largest chaebols, went bankrupt. The economy as a whole rapidly 
deteriorated and the depreciation of the currencies accelerated in November   4
1997.4  As foreign banks started refusing rollover of loans to Korean banks, 
the liquidity of bank loans in Korea quickly depleted, which induced further 
depreciation of the Won. Eventually, Korea needed the IMF assistance to avoid 
default of commercial banks obligations. 5  The overview of the Korean 
economy and a detailed survey of the Korean bank’s debt restructuring process 
in early 1998 are shown in, for example, Sung (1998), Yoon (1999) and Coe and 
Kim (2002).   
 
Figure 1-2
Consolidated international claims of Reporting Bankss vis-a-vis Korea
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Even before the crisis, the non-performing assets in the banking sector had 
become increasingly conspicuous as corporate insolvency increased. As of 
September 1997, the commercial banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs) 
amounted to W28.5 trillion, or 6.3 percent of all outstanding loans. For 
                                                  
4  Declining inventories was found to play an important role in Korea’s GDP reduction. See, for example,   
Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (2001) and Barro (2002). 
5 On November 21 1997, the Government formally requested the IMF for financial assistance. The 
authorities and IMF agreed on December 3, 1997 on a program amounting to $57 billion: $21 billion 
from the IMF, $10 billion from the World Bank, $4 billion from the Asian Development Bank, and the 
rest from bilateral loans. The IMF Board approved the program on December 4, 1997.   5
example, Krueger and Yoo (2002) address the role of the chaebols in the 
Korean crisis and find that the corporate sector’s profitability fell to very low 
levels in the 1990s. Despite the deterioration, banks continued to roll over the 
chaebol’s outstanding debt. 
 
When the won sharply depreciated in November and December, many banks 
and corporations suffered from the balance sheet deterioration. Foreign 
currency denominated liabilities suddenly became unbearably large.   
Although the won recovered from the trough at the end of December, it never 
reached the level before the crisis.  Structural problem as well as liquidity 
problem in banks’ balance sheets became serious.6  By the spring of 1998, it 
became increasingly clear that Korean industrial companies as well as banks 
needed restructuring.  Structural reforms were planned in consultation with 
the International Monetary Fund, as Korea had become under the IMF 
program in December 1998.     
 
On April 14, 1998, the Government announced the basic restructuring 
framework aiming to stabilize financial markets through swift reform and 
provide sufficient fiscal support and to enhance the efficiency and 
transparency in the banking sector. 7    Several strong measures were 
implemented quickly, mostly in conjunction with the IMF program. 
 
A new regulatory framework to supervise the financial sector had to be 
created.8  The Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO), which had 
existed before the crisis, had to be reorganized and given several new 
                                                  
6 As of the end of March 1998, total NPLs of all financial institutions amounted to W112 trillion, 
consisting of W87 trillion of banks and W25 trillion for non-banks. This amount was estimated at about 
20 percent of financial institutions’ total assets, implying that non-performing assets could 
approximately be more than quarter of the 1997 GDP of W421 trillion. 
7 The bank recapitalization strategies and financial distress resolutions of four East Asian countries are 
summarized in Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel (2001). 
8  A variety of approaches exist with respect to government assumption of financial losses in the banking 
system. These included direct injection of capital of subordinated debt, provision of loss-sharing 
arrangements on some pool of assets, grants of government loans, etc. the advantages and disadvantages 
of these approaches are summarized in, for example, Klingebiel (2001).   6
mandates, such as to purchase and dispose of NPLs from financial sector.9  
The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) were created.  The KDIC was created to work out for 
provision of financial assistance in 1997, in addition to its primary role of 
protection of depositors. The FSC was established in 1998 as the single 
financial regulator in Korea. The restructuring plan for strengthening 
banking institutions was accompanied by fiscal support from the government 
as well. 
 
It should be noted that there was a heavy government involvement, with large 
fiscal expenditures, in the process of banking system restructuring.  Public 
funds were injected to financial institutions for their recapitalization and for 
purchasing the NPLs. Fiscal assistance was also provided to acquire banks.  
In order to raise the BIS capital ratio of financial institutions that were 
regarded as “viable”, the government gave financial support. Furthermore, 
Korea First Bank and Seoulbank was nationalized on January 31, 1998 and 
Hanvit Bank became a de facto  state-owned  bank  in  early  1999.    
 
With strong government actions, the total amount of NPLs has been declining 
and the NPL ratio has substantially declined since 1998.  The total NPLs in 
the financial sector have been reduced by half. It decreased from W60.2 trillion 
at the end of 1998 to W31.3 trillion at the end of 2001. The overall NPL ratio for 
financial sector also declined significantly from 10.4% as of December 1998 to 
4.9% as of December 2001. The resolution progress of NPLs among banks has 
been successful so far.   
 
The number of critically ailing banks and other financial institutions posed a 
major obstacle for restructuring of the banking sector.  In tandem with work 
on NPLs resolution, closures and mergers of financial institutions have been 
pursued. The total number of financial institutions (commercial banks, 
specialized banks and merchant banks) reduced from 63 as of December 1997 
                                                  
9  Recently, countries have increasingly used publicly owned Asset management Companies (AMC). 
The AMCs are classified into two types. The first type was to help and expedite corporate restructuring, 
whereas the second type was to dispose of assets acquired or transferred to the government during the 
crisis. The latter is known as rapid asset disposition vehicles. See, for example, Klingebiel (2001).   7
to 32 as of December 2000, and further down to 21 as of December 2004. The 
merger program for banks and financial institutions initiated in 1998 was, to 
some extent, successful in bringing down the total number of financial 
institutions. However, the number of financial institutions in Korea was still 
excessive.  
 
Although most of the bank restructuring problem has been worked out and the 
worst is clearly over, some challenges remain.  Among the non-bank sector, 
the total NPLs did not improve significantly.10  Many merchant banks were 
closed, and the NPLs among remaining merchant banks have rather increased. 
Among the smaller financial institutions, NPLs are still a concern: the current 
NPLs might become long-term NPLs and new NPLs may develop in the near 
future. 
 
Now large Korean banks have been merged, and some foreign-owned 
institutions are gaining market share.  On the other hand, corporate demand 
for bank loans has been lower as corporate restructuring reduced the number of 
large companies in each industry. Lending to households has increased sharply 
in recent years, and credit quality may be questioned when the next downturn 
comes. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes institutional 
details of the banking sector in the historical perspective. Section 3 reviews 
the resolution of non-performing loans in banking sector. Section 4 
summarizes the consolidation process of financial institutions through 
mergers and closures. Section 5 describes the fiscal support for restructuring 
of banking system through various measures. From Section 6 to Section 8, the 
creation and reorganization of financial supervisory bodies and their functions 




                                                  
10 The NPL ratio in non-bank sector still exceeded 20% as of end-2000.   8
2.   Banking  Institutions 
The Korean financial institutions are categorized into three groups: (1) 
Deposit-taking money banks (Bank), including commercial and specialized 
banks, (2) Non-Bank banks, including merchant banks, Mutual Savings, 
Lease Companies, and Credit Unions, and (3) Non-bank financial institutions 
including development, savings, investment, insurance, and other 
institutions.  
 
Banks (deposit-taking money banks) are sub-divided into commercial banks 
and  specialized banks. Commercial banks may be (1) nationwide banks, (2) 
regional banks, or (3) branches of foreign banks.  Commercial banks engage 
in conventional commercial banking business, including deposit-taking, 
commercial lending, and payments and settlements, and also handling 
securities businesses subject to certain limitation. They also deal with trust 
and credit card businesses. However, commercial banks are banned from 
insurance business. Nationwide banks hold the largest assets among 
commercial banks and their major funding sources are bank deposits. As of 
the end of 2004, there were 8 nationwide commercial banks and 5 regional 
banks. Regional banks were authorized to operate principally within their 
own provinces.   
 
   9
Figure 2-1
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The figures above show the time series of bank loans outstanding and its rate 
of change from 1994 Q1 to 2002 Q3. The figures show a steady growth of bank 
loans throughout this period with notable exception in 1998.    The rate of loan 
growth was about 10% on a yearly basis. The banks increased new lending 
just before the crisis (the rate of loan growth was 17.2%, 13.9%, and 14.6% in 
1996 Q3, 1996 Q4, and 1997 Q1, respectively), compared to the previous two 
years of 10% on average.     
 
It is also remarkable that bank loan growth rates became really high, 
exceeding 20% in 1999-2000.    This loan growth showed the strong recovery of 
the banking sector and corporate loan demand in the recovery process from 
the crisis. 
 
The next table and figure show the loans extended to business sectors. Most of 
the lending went to manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Although the 
share of lending to hotel and restaurant and real estate sectors was small, 
their growth rates were quite high.  Lending share of these two sectors were 
about 1 percent of loans in 1994, but grew to 1.5% by 1996.  However, the 
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    Financil Intermedi  11
Before the crisis, financial institutions increased their lending to hotels & 
restaurants and real estate rent (bubble-related) sectors. The average loan 
growth of all sectors at the end of 1995 and 1996 were 12.24% and 16.20%, 
respectively.  In contrast, the growth of loans to hotels & restaurants 
increased from 10.9% at the end of 1995 to 52.6% at the end of 1996, and the 
growth of loans to real estate sector increased from 21.3% at the end of 1995 to 
41.6% at the end of 1996. The average growth of loans to these two 
bubble-related sectors increased from 17.5% to 45.4%.     
 
 
However, it is premature to conclude that lending to real estate and property 
loans before the crisis became a problem for banks.  The share in total 
lending still remained very small, despite a fast growth.  The increase after 
the crisis was even higher compared to the pre-crisis period. Therefore, 










Table 2-1: Loans by Business Sector (Deposit Money Banks) (trillion of Won)
1994Q4 1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4 2002Q2 2002Q3
    Agri. Hunting & Forest 11.15 13.68 14.94 16.69 16.70 18.38 18.82 17.78 18.53 18.14
    Mining & Quarring  0.36 0.43 0.42 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.61 0.72
    Manufacturing      57.13 62.39 69.47 74.29 70.69 79.82 89.72 88.05 94.45 95.95
    Construction        8.90 11.40 13.07 13.77 14.16 14.81 15.25 13.52 16.97 18.71
    Hotel & Restaurant (A) 0.51 0.57 0.87 1.35 1.92 3.69 5.28 7.00 8.86 9.78
    Real Estate Rent. (B) 0.89 1.08 1.53 1.96 3.26 6.01 8.74 12.76 18.01 20.26
        (A)+(B) 1.40 1.65 2.40 3.31 5.19 9.70 14.02 19.75 26.88 30.04
    Trade & Repair     9.78 11.59 14.77 17.34 16.70 22.15 25.28 26.80 30.55 31.67
    Transport Storage  1.86 2.24 2.73 3.48 4.09 5.09 6.67 6.82 7.32 7.47
    Financil Intermedi 3.66 2.13 2.23 3.86 6.75 7.63 14.17 7.56 6.88 5.77
  Households         36.56 41.45 50.19 58.53 55.52 79.13 108.95 157.61 193.19 210.16
  Total Loans & Discount 135.85 152.48 177.18 200.40 200.29 250.24 310.80 357.38 416.93 441.17
Source: Bank of Korea.
Table 2-2: Loan Yearly Growth Rate by Business Sector (Deposit Money Banks), %
1995Q4 1996Q4 1997Q4 1998Q4 1999Q4 2000Q4 2001Q4
    Hotel & Restaurant (A) 10.89 52.58 55.13 42.73 91.81 43.14 32.51
    Real Estate Rent. (B) 21.29 41.61 28.42 66.17 84.17 45.44 45.97
        (A)+(B) 17.49 45.40 38.10 56.63 87.01 44.56 40.90
  Total Loans & Discount 12.24 16.20 13.10 -0.06 24.94 24.20 14.99
Source: Bank of Korea. 
Specialized banks finance small- and medium-sized enterprises as policy 
finance. They are principally established as a vehicle of the government to 
control the flow of funds to specific sectors to carry out its industrial policy. 
They also engage in commercial banking activities. As of December 2004, 
there were five specialized banks: Korea Development Bank, Industrial Bank 
of Korea, Export-Import Bank of Korea, National Agricultural Cooperatives. 
Federation, National Federation of Fisheries. Among these specialized banks, 
the Korea Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of Korea engage in 
similar activities. They provide medium- and long-term loans/ credit to sectors 





Non-bank banks includes Merchant banks, Mutual Savings and Lease 
companies and Credit unions. These institutions work as financial 
intermediaries in the money and capital markets. Merchant banks in Korea 
have similar functions to those of merchant banks in Britain and investment 
banks in the United States. Merchant banks chiefly raise funds through the 
issuance of their own paper, cash management accounts (CMAs), and 
borrowing.  Merchant banks use their funds in the form of purchasing 
Figrue 2-4: Banking System in Korea
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securities, making loans, and leasing assets. They do not deal with payment 
settlement, stock brokerage, insurance, and household lending. Merchant 
banks were originally launched in the form of joint ventures with foreign 
financial institutions, in order to support the inducement of foreign capital to 
the private sector and offer comprehensive financial services.   
 
The number of merchant banks increased sharply from 1993 to 1997. A 
number of investment and finance companies, categorized in Nonbank 
Financial institutions and specialized in short-term financing business such 
as the discount and sale of commercial paper and cash management accounts 
(CMAs), was converted into merchant banking corporations. The background 
of this conversion from Nonbank financial institutions to Merchant banks 
reflected the fact that the demand for CMAs in non-bank financial institutions 
declined sharply due to the financial liberalization; these institutions were 
re-categorized as merchant banks and encouraged to do new businesses. The 
merchant banks extended lending to various sizes from very small firms to 
large government guaranteed companies. However, lending was 
over-extended without risk management, and quality of loan portfolio quickly 
damaged. Due to deteriorated balance sheets, the merchant banks were 
already in trouble by the summer of 1997. In the early stages of the crisis, this 
was the category of institutions that were identified as the weakest 
institutions. A large number of merchant banks were liquidated following the 














Table2-3: Number of Merchant banks (at the end of reporting year)
1985 1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
existing companies 6 6 6 6 7 3 3 2 2
Converted compaies* - - 9 24 3 1 - - -
source: Financial Systems in Korea, Bank of Korea.














 Non-bank financial institutions include securities, development, savings, 
investment, insurance and other institutions. These institutions function as 
supplementary financial institutions, but do not act as financial 
intermediaries.  
 
The banking system was the main funding sources for business and firms in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In the early 1970s, the Government established various 
NBFIs (Non-bank financial institutions) and developed the securities market 
to diversify the sources of investment funds. NBFIs have grown rapidly owing 
to their higher interest rates and greater degree of managerial autonomy. As 
a result, the banking sector’s share of deposits decreased from 51 percent in 
1975 to about 20 percent in 1997, while that of non-bank increased sharply.     
 
The banking sector also suffered due to inefficient internal management. The 
Government-led growth strategy and Government intervention in the 
financial sector prevented the development of market discipline and caused 
moral hazard. Investors perceived that commercial and merchant banks have 
long operated under the implicit Government guarantee that the Government 
would not allow the banks to fail, although it is not legally codified. Extensive 
Government involvement in the internal management of financial institutions 
has undermined their accountability. Its ineffective supervisory system 
allowed excessive risk taking by financial institutions. In the absence of 
proper prudential supervision, the domestic financial institutions borrowed 
more funds abroad and invested in riskier projects. Selective credit allocation 
and prolonged interest control by the  g o v e r n m e n t  a l s o  r e s u l t e d  i n  a n  
inefficient and distorted financial system.11 The financial system as a whole 
was inadequate by international standards.   
 
In sum, the financial sectors had transformed from a strictly regulated system 
to a more liberalized system. However, liberalization took place in the form of 
growing non-bank sectors, especially, merchant banks and non-bank financial 
                                                  
11 Barth, Cario and Levine (2001) show that, from their empirical results, the tighter the restrictions 
placed on the bank activity, on average, the more inefficient banks are and the grater the likelihood of a 
banking crisis is.     18
institutions. The growth in non-bank sectors took place without sufficient 
supervision and prudential regulation. 
 
To some extent, the transformation of the financial sector after the crisis was 
necessary to correct the overextension of bank loans before the crisis.  
Liberalization of merchant banking before the crisis seems to be carried out 




3. Resolution of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs)   
Even before the Thai currency crisis, the financial system in Korea had shown 
hint of stress in its system. Some of the conglomerates were already in a 
financially difficult condition even before the Korean crisis erupted in October 
1997.12   
Since no bank failed in the past, implicit government guarantee on deposits 
and other liabilities of financial institutions were believed to be in place.   
 
Non-performing loans (NPLs) among non-bank financial institutions amounted 
to W28.5 trillion as of September 1997, or 6.3 percent of all outstanding loans. 
Merchant banks held W3.9 trillion of bad loans as of October 1997, or 2.9 
percent of all outstanding loans. Commercial banks suffered from bankruptcies 
of borrowers, and NPL amounted to 5.8 percent of total loans by December 
1997, compared with 3.9 percent in December 1996. By the end of 1997, 
commercial banks held 82.5 percent of all NPLs among banks, and 78 percent 
among financial institutions, making them highly vulnerable to the financial 
                                                  
12 In January 1997, Hambo Steel, the 14th–largest Korean chaebol (Korean industry conglomerate), 
collapsed, leaving US$6 billion in debts, followed by the filing for court protection by seven of the thirty 
largest chaebol. On April 14, the Jinro Group, the country's largest liquor distiller and 19th-largest 
cheabol, was nearly $3.5 billion in debt and needed a bank bailout to stay solvent. On July 19, 1997, 
Daewoo, one of Korea's biggest conglomerates, narrowly avoided bankruptcy by pledging $8.6 billion in 
assets to persuade lenders to roll over debts it could not pay. The chaebol were running up huge debts. 
The difficulties in manufacturing sectors of large conglomerates spilled over to banks. At this stage, the 
Korean banking crisis is different from banking crises in Thailand and Japan, where asset inflation and 
deflation caused the major difficulties to the banking sector.     19
crisis.    Moreover, only two of 12 commercial banks had satisfied the required 8 
percent capital adequacy ratio (CAR). 
 
<NPL classification> 
In calculating NPLs, classification of loan portfolio is a crucial problem.    Korea 
had adopted a tightened loan classification standard effective on July 1, 1998 in   
line with international standards. Loans in arrears for three months or more 
are now classified as substandard or lower, and loans in arrears for one to three 





<NPLs in Banks> 
Expressed as a percentage of total loans, NPLs for the commercial banks rose 
from 3.9% as of the end of 1996 to 5.8% at the end of 1997. The NPL ratio 
further increased to 7.1% at the end of 1998. The total NPLs for commercial 
banks were W22.4 trillion and W11.4 trillion for specialized banks in December 
1998.13  
 
In March 1998, the NPL ratio was 8.0% and 7.3% for commercial banks and 
specialized banks, respectively, and the average NPL ratio for banks was 7.8%. 
The increase in the NPL ratio was most significant in the case of commercial 
banks: the NPL ratio had risen from 5.8% as of December 1997 to 7.8% as of 
March 2000. The NPL ratio of the specialized banks remained relatively stable 
and decreased a little from 8.0% at the end of 1998 to 7.3% March 2000. The 
NPL ratio was at its peak in early 2000. 
 
 
                                                  
13 The size of publicly announced NPLs of banking sector was said to be underestimated. The actual 
size was reported to exceed 30%    by Ernest & young’s estimation.       
Table 3-1: Loan Classification
Period of Overdue Payment Up to June 30 1998 After July 1 1998
1-3 months Normal Precautionary
3-6 months Precautionary Substandard/Doutful





Table 3-2: NPLs of Commercial Banks (at the end of year) (in trillion won)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Mar 2000 2000 2001 2003
   Total NPLs 11.7 12.5 12.2 21.3 22.4 27.2 23.8 10.9 12.2
   NPL ratio(%) 5.6 5.2 3.9 5.8 7.1 8.0 6.6 2.9 2.6





Table 3-3: Non-performing Loans of Banks (trillion won)
Sep Dec March June Dec March June Dec Dec Sept
1998 1998 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2002 2003
Commercial Banks 22.4 22.2 27.2 26.7 23.8 19.5 15 10.9 11.3 12.2
Specialized Banks 12.6 11.4 10.6 8.5 5.7 5.9 5.9 4.6 3.8 4.4
Total 35.0 33.6 37.8 35.2 29.5 25.4 20.9 15.5 15.1 16.6









 The NPLs of the banks peaked in early 2000 and then declined toward the end 
of the year. The NPLs for commercial banks were W27.2 trillion and W10.6 
trillion for specialized banks as of March 2000. The NPLs of commercial banks 
and specialized banks were W23.8 trillion and W5.7 trillion, respectively, as of 
December  2000.  The  NPL  ratio  of  banks  significantly declined from 7.8% as of 
March 2000 to 5.6% as of December 2000: 6.6% for commercial banks because 
KAMCO bought up NPLs from commercial banks. The NPLs resolution was 
further enhanced during 2001.  The total NPLs of banks were W15.5 trillion 
as of December 2001 but the level slightly increased to W17.3 trillion at the end 
of 2003.  The NPLs of commercial banks reduced W12.9 trillion from the 
previous year and dropped to W10.9 trillion at the end of 2001, but again, it 
increased to W12.9 trillion at the end of 2003. The NPLs for specialized banks 
were W4.6 trillion at the end of 2001 and W4.4 at the end of 2003.    Overall, the 
NPL ratio also declined in banks.  As of end of 2003, the NPL ratio was 2.6% 
for commercial banks and 2.1% for specialized banks. The average NPL ratio of 
banks, 2.4% at the end of 2003, was even lower than the 1996 level of 3.9% for 
commercial  banks.    
 
 
<NPLs in non-banks and other financial institutions> 
In terms of the NPLs performance of different financial institutions, both 
non-banks and insurance and securities companies were found to experience a 
significant increase in their total NPLs and the NPL ratio from 1998 to 2000. 
The NPL ratio for Non-banks was 24.3% at the end of 1998 and rose to 31.8% in 
March 2000. The NPL ratio was at its peak of 32.9% for non-banks at the end of 
2000.   
 
The total NPLs in non-banks have declined since 1998: NPLs decreased from 
W21.2 trillion at the end of 1998 to W14.2 trillion at the end of 2000. While the 
total NPLs in non-banks declined by W7 trillion from the end of 1998 to 2000, 
the NPL ratio had increased by 8.6%: This was largely due to the fact that the 
total outstanding loan of non-banks has declined dramatically since 1998, in 
reflection of the financial and banking crises whereas the resolution of NPLs 
was rather slow. 
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The total NPLs and the NPL ratio for non-banks declined to W9.1 trillion and 
23.3%, respectively, at the end of 2001.  Although both NPLs and the NPL 
ratio had decreased during 2000 for the non-bank sector, the progress of NPL 
resolution varied among financial institutions. While the level of NPLs and the 
NPL ratio had substantially declined in Mutual Savings, Lease Companies, 
and Credit Unions, the NPL resolution did not show improvement for 
Merchant banks. Total NPLs in Merchant banks increased from W0.8 trillion 
at the end of 2000 to W0.9 trillion at the end of 2001. The NPL ratio rose by 





With regard to resolution of NPLs of securities companies, the progress 
remained slow. The NPL ratio was 46.6% as of the end of 1998 and 52.6% as of 
the end of 2000. The NPL ratio rose by 6% point in 1999 and 2000. The level of 
NPL ratio remained relatively the same at the end of 2001, 51.7%, compared 
with the level at the end of 2000, 52.6%. The total NPLs increased from W3.4 





Table 3-4: Non-performing Loans of Non-Banks
(trillion won)
Sep Dec March June Dec Dec
1998 1998 2000 2000 2000 2001
Non-perforning loans 29.0 26.6 16.8 16.2 14.2 9.1
Ratio (%)* 19.0 20.0 31.8 32.7 32.9 23.3
source: Financial Supervisory Commission, Press Release, various issues. 
* NPLs to total outstanding loans.
Table 3-5: NPLs of Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(trillions of won)
1998 2000 2001
Insurance companies 2.0 2.5 2.1
(ratio, %) 5.2 5.6 4.6
Securities and ITMCs 3.4 4.0 4.6
(ratio, %) 46.6 52.6 51.7
As of the end of reporting year.
source: Financial Supervisory Commission, Press Release, various issues.   25
<Summary> 
On the surface, both the amount of total NPLs and the NPL ratio in financial 
sector have substantially declined since 1999. The total NPLs in the financial 
sector decreased by half; that is, from W66.7 trillion at the end of 1999 to W31.3 
trillion at the end of 2001.  The overall NPL ratio for financial sector also 
significantly declined from 11.3% as of December 1999 to 4.9% as of December 
2001. Among them, the total NPLs (NPL ratio) in banks showed a substantial 
decline: Despite a swing back of the total NPLs as well as NPL ratio in 2003, 
the total NPL ratio of banks declined to 2.4% as of December 2003.  The 
resolution process of NPLs in banks was successful. 
 
Despite several measures undertaken for restructuring of NPLs after 1998, the 
total NPLs in non-banks did not show a great improvement. Although the NPL 
ratio had declined by 9.6% in 2001 from 33% as of the end of 2000, it still 
exceeded 20%. Furthermore, the NPLs in Merchant banks had rather 
deteriorated. Both the amount of NPLs and the NPL ratio had increased during 
the course of 2001. The amount of total outstanding had also rose at this time. 
Therefore, there emerged concerns about the accumulation of NPLs: Not only 
might the current NPLs become long-term NPLs, but the newly created NPLs 
will also develop in the near future.         26
 
Table 3-6: NPL Breakdown by Financial Sector  (trillions of won)
December 1998 March 2000 December 2000 December 2001 December 2003
Total SBA* NPL** Total SBA* NPL*** Total SBA* NPL*** Total SBA* NPL*** Total SBA* NPL***
Bank Commercial Banks 300.6 22.2 339.3 47.4 27.2 361.4 32.0 23.8 379.1 12.6 10.9 504.6 16.9 12.9
(ratio, %) 7.4 14.0 8.0 8.9 6.6 3.3 2.9 2.6
Specialized Banks 142.8 11.4 146.1 16.7 10.6 164.7 10.1 5.7 172.1 6.2 4.6 206.0 6.3 4.4
(ratio, %) 8.0 11.4 7.3 6.1 3.5 3.6 2.7 2.1
Bank Total 443.4 33.6 485.4 64.1 37.8 526.1 42.1 29.5 551.2 18.8 15.5 710.6 23.2 17.3
(ratio, %) 7.6 13.2 7.8 8.0 5.6 3.4 2.8 2.4
Non-Bank Merchant Banks 28.0 5.6 9.1 1.6 1.6 3.5 1.3 0.8 2.9 1.0 0.9
(ratio, %) 20.0 17.6 17.6 37.1 22.9 34.5 31.0
Mutual Savings 22.0 5.3 17.4 6.0 6.0 15.7 5.8 5.8 15.9 3.1 3.1
(ratio, %) 24.1 34.5 34.5 36.9 36.9 19.5 19.5
Lease Companies 25.9 7.8 16.2 6.7 6.7 13.7 6.0 6.0 9.6 3.9 3.9
(ratio, %) 30.1 41.4 41.4 43.8 43.8 40.6 40.6
credit Unions 11.2 2.5 10.1 2.5 2.5 10.3 1.6 1.6 10.7 1.2 1.2
(ratio, %) 22.3 24.8 24.8 15.5 15.5 11.2 11.2
Non-Bank Total 87.1 21.2 52.8 16.8 16.8 43.2 14.7 14.2 39.1 9.2 9.1
(ratio) 24.3 31.8 31.8 34.0 32.9 23.5 23.3
Insurance Insurance  companies 38.7 2.0 43.9 5.5 44.5 3.8 2.5 45.2 2.5 2.1
and (ratio, %) 5.2 12.5 8.5 5.6 5.5 4.6
Securities Securities and ITMCs 7.3 3.4 10.5 4.0 7.6 4.0 4.0 8.9 4.6 4.6
Companies (ratio, %) 46.6 38.1 52.6 52.6 51.7 51.7
TOTAL 576.5 71.0 60.2 592.6 90.4 54.6**** 621.4 64.6 50.2 644.4 35.1 31.3
(ratio, %) 12.3 10.4 15.3 9.2 10.4 8.1 5.4 4.9
Souce: Financial Supervisory Commission
* Substandard or Below
** based on asest classification standard applied to banks
*** Sum of loans 3 months or more 
****Excluding NPLs of Insurance & Securities Companies  
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4. Mergers and closures 
The currency crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 worsened the existing 
serious conditions of the balance sheets (accumulated non-performing loans 
(NPLs)) of financial institutions. In order to restore external confidence as 
well as to stabilize the financial market, the Government pressed ahead with 
financial reform program agreed upon by the government and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The distressed commercial banks and 
Merchant banking corporations with large NPLs and poor asset quality had to 
be closed down. The number of banks declined from 33 at the end of 1997 to 19 
at the end of 2004.  The number of Merchant Banks declined significantly 
from 30 at the end of 1997 to 2 at the end of 2004. For viable financial 
institutions, the government provided funds through the recapitalization and 
the purchase of their NPLs on the condition of their own intensive self-rescue 
efforts. To qualify the government’s assistance, banks and financial 























































1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Figure 4-1









   28
 
<Mergers and Closures of Banks> 
The financial supervisory Commission (FSC) had surveyed assets and 
liabilities of twelve banks that had failed to meet the BIS 8% capital adequacy 
ratios at the end of 1997. These banking institutions were required to submit 
management rehabilitation plans. Upon its examination of these plans, the 
FSC determined five commercial banks (Daedong, Dongnam, Dongwha, 
Kyungki and ChungChong) as non-viable on June 29, 1998.  The five banks 
were requested to be liquidated and to have their good assets and liabilities 
transferred to stronger banks under a purchase and assumption (P&A) 
arrangement. The P&A order was a historical event: No Korean bank had 
ever been closed before 1997, and it gave a clear signal that financial 
institutions would no longer enjoy unconditional protection. The assets of the 
five closed banks constituted only 7.3 percent of the 12 undercapitalized 
banks’ total assets. The acquiring banks (Kookmin, Housing & Commercial, 
Shinhan, KorAm and Hana) would purchase the sound assets and assume the 
liabilities of those acquired banks. These five acquiring banks were chosen on 
the criterion of the holding of a BIS capital adequacy ratio of more than 8% at 
the end of 1997.   
 
The restructuring process of banking sector is summarized in the figure 
below.14 
 
                                                  
14  See Wang and Zang (1998).   29
 
 
Among banks whose BIS ratios exceeded eight percet at the end of 1997, 
Boram Bank was merged (consolidated) with Hana Bank. Korea Long-term 
Credit Bank was absorbed by Kookmin Bank. Of its total capital share, 17 % 
was acquired by Goldman Sachs Capital Partners in May 1999.     
 
Other financial institutions that had not been involved in the merger or 
takeover activities were Korea Exchange Bank and Peace Bank.  As for the 
Korea Exchange Bank, Commerzbank of Germany contributed W350 billion. 
Peace Bank withdrew from international business. 
 
The seven approved banks with strict conditions were requested to submit 
revised management reforms and recapitalization plans, including foreign 
fund inducement and bank merger by the end of July. The plans were 
reviewed quarterly. If the implementation plans were disapproved, a 
mandatory merger or transfer of business order had to be imposed.     
 
However, a few of the approved banks with conditions were too big to fail. 
Korea First Bank and Seoulbank proved insolvent in 1997 and were 
Figure 4-2: Bank Restructuring Flowchart
Banks falling short of       Banks meeting     Merchant banks
the 8 percent  BIS ratio   the BIS 8 percent
Rehabilitaion Plans               Diagnostic            Inspect the
(Apr 30, 1998)  review                  BIS ratio 
disapproved     conditional    approved            Performance
approved                                       review,
Quarterly
Implementaion                              review
plan(July 1998)                      
Resolution  30
recapitalized fully by the Government in January 1998 and February 1998, 
respectively. These two banks were permitted to continue their operations.   
 
In 1999, serveral bank mergers were completed. In the process of financial 
institutions merger, the government and FSC injected public funds to support 
financial institutions through their recapitalization and the purchase of their 
NPLs. Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank were conditionally 
approved for restructuring by FSC in 1998. These two banks were merged into 
Hanvit Bank in January 1999. Chungbuk Bank, Kangwon Bank and Hyundai 
Merchant Bank (non-bank) merged with ChoHung Bank and renamed as 
ChoHung Bank.   
 
The banking sector restructuring through merger further proceeded in 2000 
and in 2001.  In July 2000, National Livestock Cooperative Federation 
merged with National Agricultural Cooperative Federation. In 2001, several 
healthy banks merged or converted to a financial institution. The government 
pursued the liquidation of non-viable financial institutions. The Korea 
Deposit Insurance corporation (KDIC) established Woori Finance Holdings 
Company in March 2001, bringing Hanvit, Peace, Kwangju, and Kyongnam 
Banks, and Hanaro Merchant Banking Corporation under its umbrella. All of 
these institutions had been fully recapitalized by KDIC under Woori Finance 
Holdings Company. In October 2001, Kookmin Bank merged with Housing & 
Commercial Bank. The government had Havit Bank absorb the bank and 
trust accounts of Peace Bank, whose financial status worsened due to 
accumulated bad loans, and finally authorized the latter’s conversion into 
Woori credit Card Company in December 2001.  In 2002, Seoulbank, which 
had been solely owned by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, was sold 
to Hana Bank.   
 
By the end of 2004, there were 19 banks (8 Nationwide commercial banks, 6 
regional banks, and 5 specialized banks). However, the number of banks 
declined by 14 by the end of 1997.  The bank consolidation in Korea was 
faster than in any other Asian countries in crisis.     
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Table 4-1: Changes in the Number of Commercial Banks* (at the end of reporting year)
1997        during 1998 end-        during 1999 end-       during 2000 end-
Group of Banks exit Merger 1998 exit Merger 1999 exit Merger 2000
Nationwide banks 17 5** (5**) 12 - 1*** 11 - - 11
Regional (Local) banks 10 2** (2**) 8 2**** (2****) 6 - - 6
Specialized banks 6 6 - - 6 - 1***** 5
      during 2001 end-       during 2002 end- end- end-
Group of Banks exit Merger 2001 exit Merger 2002 2003 2004
Nationwide banks - 2****** 9 - 1******* 8 8 8
Regional (Local) banks - - 6 - - 6 6 6
Specialized banks - - 5 - - 5 5 5
source: Bank of Korea, Annual Report, various issues. 
* Excluding foreign bank branches.
**5 closed Nationwide banks 2 closed Regional banks were merged to Nationwide banks.   
***Hanvit Bank (merger of Commercial Bank of Korea(N) and Hanil Bank(N)).
****Merger of Chungbuk Bank and Kangwon Bank into Chohung Bank (N).
*****National Livestock Coop.Fed. merged with National Agricultural Coop.Fed. In July 2000.
******Kookmin Bank and Housing & Commercial Bank merged as kookmin Bank; Peace Bank converted into a credit card company.
*******Seoul Bank, which had been solely owned by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, was sold to Hana Bank.  
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<Other financial institutions> 
As for merchant banks, after evaluating the management rehabilitation plans 
of a total of thirty merchant banks, the government revoked sixteen insolvent 
institutions’ license in 1998. Their assets and liabilities were transferred to a 
bridge merchant banking corporation. In 1999, one merchant bank (Daehan 
Investment Banking) was ordered to exit. Two other merchant banks were 
merged with commercial banks: Hyundai Merchant Bank with Kangwon 
Bank, which was later absorbed into Chohung Bank, and Korea International 
Merchant Bank with Korea Exchange Bank. 
 
Many non-bank financial institutions either exited the market or merged with 
other institutions in 1998 and 1999. As a result, the number of merchant 
banks had dwindled to ten by the end of 2000.   
 
In 2001, several healthy banks established a financial holding companty as 
part of the drive toward enlargement of scale. Shinhan Bank, Shinhan 
Securities company, Shinhan capital Company and Shinhan Investment 
Trust Management Company established Shinhan Financial Group (financial 
holding company) in September 2001. The Government also revoked the 
licenses of four merchant banking corporations, Korea, H&S, Yeungnam, and 
Central, which had ben consolidated into Woori Merchant Banking 
Corporation in November 2000. Regent Merchant Banking Corporation whose 
operations had been suspended in December 2000 merged with 
Tongyang-Hyundai Merchant Banking Corporation. Through these mergers 
closures, the number of merchant banking corporations, which had reached 30 
before the currency crisis, dramatically dropped to two at the end of 2004. 
 
Table4-2: Number of Merchant banks (at the end of reporting year)
1985 1990 1995 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
existing companies 6 6 6 6 7 3 3 2 2
Converted compaies* - - 9 24 3 1 - - -
source: Financial Systems in Korea, Bank of Korea.
*: Merchant banks converted from investment and finance companies.  
 
 
<de facto Nationalization and sell off to foreign capital> 
Before the financial crisis, there were 33 banks in the country: 17 nationwide, 
10 regional and 6 specialized banks. With a number of closures and mergers, a   34
total of 19 banks remained as of the end of 2004: 8 nationwide, 6 regional and 
5 specialized. 
 
Through its support of recapitalization efforts, the Government has become a 
controlling shareholder of some of the remaining banks. Korea First Bank and 
Seoulbank have been Government banks since January 31, 1998.  Hanvit 
Bank, merger of Hanil Bank and Commercial Bank of Korea in early 1999, 
became de facto Government banks, since the public fund injected for their 
recpaitalization amounted as much as the amount injected to KFB and 
Seoulbank. Other banks have also become de facto State banks because the 
Government was heavily involved in their recapitalization process. NPLs of 
these de facto nationalized banks were acquired by KAMCO and then KDIC 
made capital injection to these institutions. 
 
Banks that required government assistance in recapitalization were Hanvit 
Bank, Korea Exchange Bank, Korea First Bank, Seoulbank, and Chohung 
Bank. In order to meet BIS CAR after June 30, 1999, each bank estimated to 
require W2.0 trillion.     
 
The two nationalized banks, Korea First Bank and Seoulbank, were sold to 
foreign banks in line with the government’s protracted privatization effort. 
The Government sold 50.99% of its shares of Korea First Bank (whose equity 
it had acquired in full) to an US investment firm, Newbridge Holdings LTD., 
in December 1999. The sell-off procedure finalized in January 2000.   
 
The basic agreement on sell-off of Seoulbank to HSBC took place in February 
1999, but the plan was called off in August 1999. The acquisition of Seoulbank 
was planned by Hana Bank as of August 2002.15 The sale of Seoulbank to 
                                                  
15 On August 19, 2002, Hana Bank has finally been officially selected by the Public Fund Oversight 
Committee as a prime bidder to take over the Seoulbank. Hana bank and the US investment fund, Lone 
Star, had been waging a race for Seoulbank since the government accepted bids on July 31. Hana offered 
an all-stock bid valued at about W1.1 trillion with a guarantee that Hana would compensate the 
government for future declines in its share price, while Lone Star offered to buy 100% of Seoulbank for 
W900 billion in cash and agreed to share W350 billion of future profit with the government. (Financial 
Times, Asian Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2002)   35
Hana Bank was the biggest privatization of banks in Korea since 1999. Hana 
Bank emerged as the country’s third largest bank, following Kookmin Bank 




The management of banking sector, in particular the merger program for 
banks and finance institutions that initiated in 1998 was, to some extent, 
successful in bringing down the total number of financial institutions. The 
number of banks had decreased by one third, from 33 banks at the end of 1997 
to 19 in December 2004. During the restructuring process, five banks did not 
meet BIS capital adequacy ratios as of the end of 1997 and were required to 
present management rehabilitation plans. They were finally regarded as 
nonviable in June 1998 and then closed.  Since no Korean banks had ever 
been closed under the implicit government’s protection, these closures were 
considered as a clear signal that financial institutions would no longer enjoy 
unconditional guarantee from the government. The management of failed 
financial institutions was forced to leave. 
 
It should be mentioned that there was heavy government involvement in the 
process of banking system restructuring. The government provided a lot of 
public fund to financial institutions during the course of mergers. Public funds 
were injected to financial institutions through recapitalization and the 
purchase of NPLs. From November 1997 to June 2001, W53.6 trillion was 
injected into financial institutions for recapitalization through KDIC and 
Bank of Korea. KAMCO purchased W38.2 trillion value of NPLs. Fiscal 
assistance was provided to acquire banks in mergers. In order to raise the BIS 
capital ratio of institutions regarded as “viable”, the government made 
financial support amounting to W27.7 trillion in the form of purchase of asset, 
subordinated debt, and compensation of losses. Furthermore, Korea First 
Bank and Seoulbank have been nationalized since January 1998 and Hanvit 
Bank became de facto Government bank. In total, the Korean government 
injected W139.5 trillion (or equivalent of US$120 billion), 26.7% of GDP, for 
restructuring the banking sector. Details of these spending will be described 
in section 5.   
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Table 4-3: Number of Financial Institutions, at the end of reporting year*
1997 1998 1999 2000 Mar2001 Jnne2001 2001 June 2002 2002 2003 2004
Banks Banks 33 26 23 22 22 22 20 20 19 19 19
Merchant Banks 30 14 10 10 5 4 3 3 3 2 2
Non- Leasing Co. 25 15 21 19 19 19 19 18
banks Mutual Savings & Finance Co. 231 211 186 146 146 125 121 117 117 114 113
Credit Unions 1666 1592 1444 1317 1311 1280 1268 1252 1233 1086 1066
Insurance Life & Non-life Insurance Co. 50 45 40 40 40 42 44 44 36 36 36
Security- Securities Co. 36 31 32 43 43 45 45 44 45 45 43
related Investment Trusts 31 24 23 29 29 29 30 31 31 32 47**
Total 2102 1957 1758 1626 1615 1566 1550 1529 1484 1334 1326
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission/Financial Supervisory Service, Annual Report, 2000;
Financial Reform & Supervision in Korea, Financial Supervisory Commission/Financial Supervisory Service, 2001;
Financial System in Korea, Bank of Korea, 2002; Bank of Korea, Annual Report, 2001.
*Excluding bridge financial institutions and branches of foreign institutions.
**Investment trust management companies and the former asset management companies have been classified among asset monagement companies since 2004. Prior to 2003, the figure were compiled on the
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With regard to banking system restructuring, especially through mergers, it is 
essential to understand that the consolidation of banking system cannot be 
attained through only mergers. The restructuring of Banks and Merchant 
banks seemed to have solved the issue of reducing number of financial 
institutions. At the same time, some financial institutions were found to be 
“too big to fail” and received public assistance. There were still many 
non-bank financial institutions. Weak, or nearly insolvent financial 
institutions had to be nationalized and restructured by the government, 
before they were sold to healthier banks or foreign capitals.   
 
It is always difficult to balance between strengthening banks with capital 
injection and forcing them to fail. In this regard, the liquidation of non-viable 
merchant banks and other financial institutions made possible by the 
Government through merger of the revocation of their license should be 
appreciated. The attempted sale of nationalized banks to foreign buyers and 
the establishment of a finance holding company among healthy financial 
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Table 4-4: Changes in the Number of Financial Institutions during 1998-2004
Group 1998 Newly 1999 Newly 2000 Newly 2001
Liquidation Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total
b a n k s B a n k s 5 38--22--11--22
Merchant Banks 16 - 16 - 1 3 4 - 1 - 1 1 4 3 7
N o n - L e a s i n g  C o . 1 0- 1 0 ------------
banks Mutual Savings & Finance Co. 22 2 24 4 21 10 31 6 28 13 41 2 23 1 24
Credit Unions 69 14 83 9 103 45 148 - 83 42 125 - 48 1 49
Insurance Insurance Co. 4 1 5 - - - - - 1 5 6 - 2 - 2
Security- Securities Co. 6 - 6 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 12 - - -
related Investment Trusts 7 - 7 - - 1 1 - - - - 3 - - -
Total 139 20 159 14 127 61 188 7 113 62 175 18 113 62 175
Group 2002 Newly 2003 Newly 2004 Newly Jan 1998-December 2004
Liquidation Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total Created Liquid Merger Total
banks Banks - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 5 9 14
Merchant Banks - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - 27 7 34
N o n - L e a s i n g  C o . - -----------81 9
banks Mutual Savings & Finance Co. 4 2 6 1 3 - 3 - 1 - 1 - 103 28 131
Credit Unions 32 3 35 - 145 2 147 - 20 - 20 - 503 107 812
Insurance Insurance Co. - - - 3 2 - 2 3 1 - 1 2 12 6 18
Security- Securities Co. - 2 2 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 2 - 8 2 10
related Investment Trusts - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 3 9 2 11
Total 36 6 42 6 151 3 154 5 23 2 25 5 675 162 1039
source: Annual Report, Bank of Korea, various issues.
*Excluding bridge financial institutions and branches of foreign institutions.  
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Table 4-5: Restructuring of Banks
end 1997 end 1998 end 1999 end  2000 end 2001
Nationwide (17) (12) (11) (11) (9)
1 Korea First Korea First Korea First Korea First Korea First
2 Commercial Bank of Korea Commercial Bank of Korea Hanvit Hanvit Hanvit
3H a n i l H a n i l
4 Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul Seoul
5 ChoHung ChoHung ChoHung ChoHung ChoHung
6 Korea Exchange  Korea Exchange  Korea Exchange  Korea Exchange  Korea Exchange 
7 Hana Hana Hana Hana Hana
8B o r a m
9 Kookmin Kookmin Kookmin Kookmin Kookmin
10 Korea Long-Term Credit
11 Daedong
12 Shinhan Shinhan Shinhan Shinhan Shinhan
13 Dongwha
14 Korea Housing Korea Housing Korea Housing Korea Housing
15 Dongnam
16 KorAm KorAm KorAm KorAm KorAm
17 Peace Peace Peace Peace     converted to Woori credit card company
Regional (10) (8) (8) (6) (6)
1 Daegue Daegue  Daegue  Daegue Daegue 
2 Pusan Pusan Pusan Pusan Pusan
3 Kwangju Kwangju Kwangju Kwangju Kwangju
4 Cheju Cheju  Cheju  Cheju Cheju 
5 Jeonbuk Jeonbuk Jeonbuk Jeonbuk Jeonbuk
6 Kyongnam Kyongnam  Kyongnam  Kyongnam Kyongnam 
7 ChungChong
8 Kangwon Kangwon Kangwon
9 Chungbuk Chungbuk Chungbuk
10 Kyonggi
Specialized (6) (6) (6) (5) (5)
1 Korea Development Bank Korea Development Bank Korea Development Bank Korea Development Bank
2 Industrial bank of Korea Industrial bank of Korea Industrial bank of Korea Industrial bank of Korea
3 Export-Import Bank of Korea Export-Import Bank of Korea Export-Import Bank of Korea Export-Import Bank of Korea
4 National Fed. Of Fisheries National Fed. Of Fisheries National Fed. Of Fisheries National Fed. Of Fisheries
5 National Agricultural Coop. Fed. National Agricultural Coop. Fed. National Agricultural Coop. Fed. National Agricultural Coop. Fed
6 National Livestock Coop. Fed. National Livestock Coop. Fed. National Livestock Coop. Fed.
source: various reports from BOK, KAMCO, FSC.  
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Table 4-5: Restructuring of Banks(Cont'd)
end 2002 end 2003 end 2004
Nationwide (8) (8) (8)
1 Korea First Korea First Korea First
2 Hanvit Hanvit Hanvit
3
4
5 ChoHung ChoHung ChoHung
6 Korea Exchange Korea Exchange Korea Exchange
7 Hana Hana Hana
8
9 Kookmin Kookmin Kookmin
10
11




16 KorAm KorAm KorAm
17
Regional (6) (6) (6)
1 Daegue Daegue  Daegue 
2 Pusan Pusan Pusan
3 Kwangju Kwangju Kwangju
4 Cheju Cheju  Cheju 
5 Jeonbuk Jeonbuk Jeonbuk





Specialized (5) (5) (5)
1 Korea Development Bank
2 Industrial bank of Korea
3 Export-Import Bank of Korea
4 National Fed. Of Fisheries
5 National Agricultural Coop. Fed
6
source: various reports from BOK, KAMCO, FSC.  
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5. Fiscal Support for Financial Restructuring---Capital Injection 
The main task of financial restructuring is the disposal of NPLs. Regarding 
financial sector restructuring, there are two critical questions: (1) how to 
share the costs among the institutions concerned and (2) how to mobilize the 
additional resources. Upon the institutions’ own restructuring efforts, several 
measures such as capital injection by the government should be taken so that 
the taxpayers’ burden and the moral hazard can be minimized. Institutions 
judged as non-viable should be closed. Then, the government should inject 
public funds into troubled financial institutions, in order to reverse the 
deterioration of the balance sheet and also to Bank for International 
Settlements’ Capital Adequacy Ratio (BIS CAR) of institutions up to 10%. The 
fiscal support was provided only to (1) supplement the institutions’ own 
restructuring and financing plans, and (2) purchase NPLs, recapitalize viable 
institutions, and pay off deposits, but only if the self-rescue plans of ailing 
institutions were successfully implemented.16  
 
The government’s basic principles for fiscal support were as follows: (1) it 
would not support financial institutions unless they exerted appropriate 
self-rehabilitation efforts, and (2) fiscal support should be sufficient to make 
troubled financial institutions solvent. Public funds injection was made 
through the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO), Bank of Korea (BOK) and from fiscal 
resources.  
 
Capital injection by KDIC was used for recapitalizing financial institutions, 
compensating the losses sustained by the financial institutions that had 
acquired troubled institutions at government request, and purchasing assets 
of troubled institutions. KDIC also provided public funds for the repayment of 
deposits of closed financial institutions. KAMCO purchased the NPLs of 
financial institutions. The government provided public funds from fiscal 
resources. Bank of Korea injected capital into financial institutions.   
 
                                                 
16 For discussion and survey on recapitalization through public funds, see Enoch, Garcia and 
Sundararajan (2001).   42
In order to promote the recapitalization of banks and to resolve NPLs, the 
government injected a total of W63.6 trillion through the KDIC, KAMCO, 
BOK and by ways of Fiscal Resource between November 1997 and December 
1998. The government provided a total of W27.8 trillion through the KDIC to 
protect depositors and to prevent deterioration of the management status of 
the acquiring banks in the process of the resolution of insolvent financial 
institutions. Of this amount, W14.6 trillion was for the repayment of deposits 
with closed institutions and W6.9 trillion was the compensation for the losses 
sustained by the acquiring banks.17  In order to prevent any further decline 
in their BIS capital adequacy ratios, the government injected a total of W6.3 
trillion through the KDIC into the acquiring banks and into banks arranging 
to merge. 18     As for Korea First Bank and Seoulbank which were 
nationalized since January 1998, the government singed MOUs with a U.S. 
financial consortium led by New bridge Capital to sell its shares to Korea 
First Bank, as well as with a British financial corporation, HSBC Holdings 
BV, to sell its shares to Seoulbank. 
 
Moreover, the government set up the Non-performing Asset Management 
Fund in November 1997 and had it purchased at discount NPLs with a book 
value of W44.8 trillion for W19.4 trillion in the period between November 
1997 and December 1998. The government provided W16.3 trillion from fiscal 
resource for recapitalization of Korea Development Bank, Export-Import 
Bank of Korea, Industrial Bank of Korea, Korea Investment Trust Company, 
and purchase of subordinated debt in order to raise BIS capital ratios. 
 
In 1999, the government made a total of W31 trillion of public funds injection 
into financial institutions.  Categorizing the sources, the KDIC provided a 
total of W23.8 trillion. Of this amount, W13.7 trillion was for recapitalization 
of financial institutions, and W4.1 trillion for compensation of losses in 
financial institutions that had acquired troubled financial institutions at 
                                                 
17  On June 29, 1998, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) ordered the closure of five banks: 
Daedong, Donghwa, Dongnam, Kyunggi, and Chungchong banks. 
18 In the banking sector, Korea First Bank and Seoulbank, the two banks in deepest trouble, were 
recapitalized by the government and the KDIC in January 1998. The KDIC made a contribution 
amounting to W5.8 trillion to the five merger banks in September 1998.   43
government request. Another W3.7 trillion was for the purchase of assets of 
Korea First Bank. A total of 2.3 trillion was for the repayment of deposits at 
closed financial institutions. 
 
In addition, KAMCO provided a total of W4.5 trillion for purchasing the NPLs 
of financial institutions. The government devoted a total of W2.4 trillion from 
fiscal resources for recapitalization and purchase of subordinated debt. Of this 
amount, W1.8 trillion was used for recapitalizing Korea Development Bank, 
Export-Import Bank of Korea, Industrial Bank of Korea, Korea Investment 
Trust Company, and Daehan Investment Trust Company. Another W600 
billion was used to purchase subordinated debt. The Bank of Korea made 
W700 billion of capital injection into the Export-Import Bank of Korea.   
 
In 2000, the government devoted about W35 trillion in public funds to support 
financial institutions. Of this amount, KDIC provided W22.6 trillion, KAMCO 
provided W12.1 trillion, the government devoted W100 billion from fiscal 
sources, and the Bank of Korea injected W200 billion into financial 
institutions.   
 
The W14.6 trillion provided by KDIC was for recapitalization and W0.7 
trillion for compensation of losses in financial institutions. In addition, a total 
of W5.4 trillion was used to purchase the assets of financial institutions, and 
W2.4 trillion was for the repayment of deposits at merchant banking 
corporations, mutual savings and finance companies, and credit unions that 
had exited the market. 
 
In terms of the assistance from public funds by type of financial institution, 
W11.4 trillion in public funds went to banks, W2.8 trillion to merchant banks, 
and W4.6 trillion to insurance companies. 
 
As of December 2004, a total of W405.1 trillion of public funds had been 
injected into financial institutions since November 1997. KDIC injected a total 
of W164.1 trillion and KAMCO has purchased NPLs amounting W38.4 trillion. 
The government has provided W18.8 trillion from fiscal resource for 
recapitalization and purchase of subordinated debt, and the Bank of Korea 
has injected W900 billion into financial institutions. Among the capital   44
injection of W164.1 trillion by KDIC since 1997, W62.9 trillion was used for 
recapitalization and W27.2 trillion was for compensation of losses in the 
financial institutions that had acquired troubled financial institutions at 
government request. About W20.3 trillion was used to purchase those assets 
of financial institutions. A total of W53.8 trillion was made available for the 




The government’s basic principles for fiscal support for financial restructuring 
have been that (1) it will not provide financial assistance to institutions unless 
they exert appropriate self-rehabilitation efforts and practice fair loss sharing 
among concerned parties, and (2) fiscal support should be sufficient to make 
troubled financial institutions solvent.   
 
From November 1997 to December 2004, the government had injected a total 
of W405.1 trillion into financial institutions, among which W38.4 trillion 
worth of NPLs and W6.4 trillion worth of subordinate debt and/or assets were 
purchased by the Government. In addition, a total of W76.2 trillion were spent 
for recapitalization of institutions. According to the plan, most of the fiscal 
support was expected to be recouped through (1) sale of collateralized assets, 
(2) divestment of acquired equity shares of financial institutions, and (3) 
liquidation of insolvent financial institutions. Thus, the authorities insisted 
that the burden on taxpayers would be limited to the interest costs related to 









   45
 
Table 5-1: Public Funds injected into financial institutions  (trillion of Won)
Source Support Type Nov.97- Jan.99- Total Jan00- Total Jan01- Total Jan02- Total Jan03- Total Jan04- Total
Dec.98 Dec.99 (1997-1999)  Dec00 (1997-2000) Dec01 (1997-2001)  Dec02 (1997-2002)  Dec03 (1997-2003)   Dec04 (1997-2004)
Recapitalization 6.3 13.7 20.0 14.2 34.2 9.6 43.8 0.0 43.8 0.0 43.8 19.1 62.9
Compensation of losses 6.9 4.1 11.0 0.7 11.7 4.5 16.2 0.3 16.6 6.1 22.6 4.6 27.2
KDIC Purchase of assets 3.7 3.7 5.4 9.1 0.6 9.7 0.7 10.3 5.3 15.6 4.6 20.2
Repayment of deposits 14.6 2.3 16.8 2.4 19.2 10.4 29.6 2.4 32.0 11.0 42.9 10.9 53.8
Sub total 27.8 23.8 51.6 22.6 74.2 25.1 99.3 3.4 102.6 22.3 124.9 39.2 164.1
KAMCO Purchase of NPLs 19.4 4.5 23.9 12.9 36.8 2.0 38.7 0.3 39.1 -0.6 38.4 0.0 38.4
Fiscal Recapitalization 10.5 1.8 12.3 0.1 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4
Resource Purchase of subordinated debt 5.8 0.6 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4
Subtotal 16.3 2.4 18.7 0.1 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8 18.8
BOK Recapitalization 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Total 63.6 31.3 94.8 35.8 130.7 27.0 157.7 161.4 183.0 222.2
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With regard to the recapitalization, part of the fiscal support was made in 
order to raise the BIS capital ratio of institutions. In addition, three banks 
have been nationalized in the process of rehabilitation. However, perhaps 
more banks could have been nationalized, if the rules were strictly applied. 
Some of the public fund might have gone to institutions that were “too big to 
fail”.  
 
With benefit of hindsight, there is an argument from the viewpoint of 
financial strain that KFB should have been liquidated, not nationalized, in its 
early stage of restructuring because the capital injected to KFB amounted far 
larger than initially expected. It is, however, difficult to decide whether and 
when bank would liquidate because of the difficulty to estimate necessary 
expenses. If once the government made capital injection to a financial 
institution, the ex-post incurred cost for capital injection, rehabilitation, and 




6. Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) 
Korea lacked an integrated regulator that would be able to conduct a full 
range of financial supervision and regulation before crisis. There was a 
growing need for a change in the supervisory system: the industry-specific 
supervisory organizations lacked efficiency and thereby created difficulties in 
maintaining consistent supervisory policies across the institutions. On April 1, 
1998, the Financial Supervisory commission (FSC) was established as an 
integrated financial supervisory institution in Korea. Under the new system, 
all financial institutions were subject to the supervision of a single 
supervisory body, the FSC, an independent government agency. The Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS), its executive arm, was subsequently established in 
1999 to lead the reform drive in the financial market. The FSC served as the 
headquarters, whereas the FSS took practical programs of action for 
resolution of financial sectors. Most of the staff working in FSC was 
transferred from KOEF, while the people in FSS were mainly recruited from 
the  private  sector.   
  
<Objective>   47
The FSC is broadly charged with policy formulation for the financial market. 
As part of its supervisory responsibilities, the FSC deliberates and resolves 
policy matters pertaining to the inspection and supervision of financial 
companies and securities and future markets. The FSC also has the authority 
to issue and revoke business licenses to financial companies. The FSS is 
charged with overseeing and supervising financial business entities and other 
participants in the market. 
 
<Banking Sector Regulatory System> 
Before the crisis, regulatory responsibility was divided between BOK and 
MOFE with BOK supervising commercial banks and MOFE supervising 
Nonbank financial institutions.19 
 
The Office of Bank Supervision (OBS) was an internal organization of BOK 
and supervised commercial banks. The trust business of commercial banks, 
however, was under the supervision of MOFE, which also had the authority to 
grant and revoke bank licenses. Lack of coordination between BOK and 
MOFE turned out to be inefficient cooperate governance of the banking sector 
in Korea. Merchant banks and other financial institutions were under MOFE 







                                                 
19  As is described below, MOFE supervised trust business of commercial banks and specialized banks, 
in addition to the supervision over non-bank financial institutions.   48
 
 
In April 1998, the government established FSC under the Office of the Prime 
Minister to function as a neutral and independent agency. FSC took over the 
supervisory power of MOFE. The four agencies—the Office of Bank 
Supervision, Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and 
Nonbank Supervisory Board—were merged into the Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSS) in January 1999. FSC also established a subcommittee, the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) in April 1998. Under the guidance 
of the FSC, the SFC oversees the securities and futures markets. Its principal 
functions include the investigation of market abuses, such as insider trading 
and market manipulation, and supervision of the accounting standards. 
        



















The consolidation of regulatory structure was intended to divest MOFE of its 
supervisory power. A regulatory structure was required to be neutral and 
independent in order to enhance the banking sector restructuring. The change 
of the system was also intended to resolve concerns that the dual regulatory 
structure, the MOFE and BOK supervisory system before the crisis, was 
ineffective and apparent to contributed to the crisis. The supervisory role and 
its functioning body were also required to meet the international standard.   
 
<FSC, MOFE, BOK> 
Regarding relationships with other authorities and agencies, the Bank of 
Korea (BOK) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) may also 
request the FSC/FSS to inspect financial companies when necessary. Joint 
inspection of financial companies by the FSC/FSS, BOK and KDIC may also 
be conducted. In this way, FSC works closely with the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MOFE), BOK and other authorities in carrying out its supervisory 
mission and formulating financial policies. 
 
Despite the change of regulatory system, the MOFE still holds legislative 
authority over any opening, closing, and merger of financial institutions and 
is responsible for drawing up of supervision related bills. The BOK and its 
Monetary Board remain as a completely independent body responsible for 
Figure 6-2: Post-crisis Regulatory Structure
Regularoty authorities       financial institutions
Banks
BOK
MOFE est. 1998 Merchant
SFC Banks
FSC FSS Mutual





monetary policy. However, the BOK, as the last resort for banks, does retain 
some of its previous supervision functions such as checking prudential 
requirements for banks. The Monetary Board has the right to request the FSC 
to reconsider any decision that may involve measures directly related to 
monetary policy. The BOK and the KDIC may request the FSC to inspect 
financial institutions when necessary, and they may also request joint 
inspections. The MOFE, the BOK, and the FSC may request information and 
documents from one another. 
 
<Additional Public fund injection> 
Immediately following the onset of the financial crisis in late 1997, 
recapitalization of both Banks and non-banks was crucial to protect depositors 
and normalize their credit intermediary role. By the end of 1999, the 
Government appropriated W64 trillion to facilitate restructuring of viable 
lenders and liquidate those that were failing. A significant portion of the 
public funds was used for the purchase of NPLs through the KAMCO and the 
KDIC. 
 
However, efforts to recapitalize the banking sector and resolve NPLs were 
hampered by the confluence of negative internal and external factors, such as 
the collapse of Daewoo Group, rising oil prices, falling semi-conductor price, 
the recession in the US and in Japan, etc., starting in the fourth quarter of 
1999. These were expected for another severe economic downturn in Korea. As 
a result, domestic financial companies continued to suffer from adverse 
market conditions, and credit crunch became more severe. Faced with the 
rapidly deteriorating economy, the Government responded with additional 
public funds aimed at removing the lingering uncertainties in the banking 
sector.   
 
For the W50 trillion that had been estimated to complete the financial 
restructuring, the National Assembly approved additional public funds of 
W40 trillion in December 2000, with the remaining W10 trillion to be raised 
through the recovery of previously injected public funds. Approximately 
W19.9 trillion was allocated to ailing financial institutions by the end of 
March 2001. 
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Table 6-1: Allocation of Additional Public Funds by End-March 2001
(trillions of won)
Equity Capital Asset Others Total
Participation Injection Purchase
Banks 4.1 0.2 1.8 0 6.1
Insurance 2.7 0.01 0 0 2.71
Merchant Banks 2.4 2.1 0 0 4.5
Investment Trust Companies 4.8 0 0 0 4.8
Others 0 1.34 0 0.4 1.74
Total 14.0 3.65 1.8 0.4 19.85
Note: the National Assembly approved W40 trillion in additional public funds in December
2000 to allocate to ailing financial companies.




In 1998, Korea established the integrated financial supervisory organization, 
the FSC. As an independent government agency, the FSC has supervisory 
responsibilities, and is also expected to work closely with MOFE, BOK, KDIC 
and other authorities in carrying out its supervisory mission and formulating 
financial policies. 
 
In the context of single vs. multiple supervisory body system, the FSC aimed 
to move away from multi-regulatory system and toward the single supervisory 
system.20 Despite the structural change of supervisory system, the FSC 
seems to have many difficulties. That is, the MOFE and BOK still hold the 
supervision functions over financial institutions, and the FSC as the single 
regulator has not been realized. It can be argued that the MOFE should 
transfer an authority to write or revise financial laws to FSC, without 
organizational reshuffling. To enforce prudential regulations, MOFE and FSC 
should coordinate more closely in applying the prudential regulations to 
specialized and development banks. In that sense, FSC should have full 
responsibility for specialized, development and commercial banks.   
                                                 
20  In the case of United Kingdom, the supervisory activities were transferred from the Bank of 
England to the financial supervisory agency (FSA), and Germany is also aiming at the unified 
regulatory system. In case of Japan, main financial supervisory function was separated from the 
Ministry of Finance and moved to a newly created FSA.      52
 
The fact that the supervisory role alone was transferred from BOK while the 
experts on the subject at BOK did not move to FSC contributed to the 
ineffective supervisory function. The personnel structure, the FSC from 
KOEF and FSS from the private sector, also has produced friction between the 
FSC and FSS, which may weaken the body and thus undermines the 





The final stage and often most difficult part of financial sector restructuring is 
the disposal of NPLs. Disposal can be done directly by banks and the financial 
institutions. But sometimes, setting up a special agency in charge of collecting 
bad debts is a good idea. Collecting and disposing of NPLs require special 
talents, and consolidating NPLs in one organization is often more efficient 
than each bank trying to deal with NPLs. Moreover, failed banks must be 
taken over by the regulator (government) and their bad assets have to be 
managed anyway. Korea was no exception. 
 
By the end of 1998, total NPLs of all financial institutions amounted to W60.2 
trillion, and loans classified as substandard or below (SBA) were W71.0 
trillion. As of March 2000, total NPLs of all financial institutions decreased to 
W54.6 trillion, consisting of W37.8 trillion NPLs of banks and W16.8 trillion 
NPLs for non-banks. On top of this, there was another W90 trillion SBAs. 
 
The purchase of NPLs was led by Korean Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO) while the recapitalization of viable institutions was done by Korea 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC). The overall restructuring efforts were 
supervised by Financial Supervisory Commission and Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSC/FSS). KAMCO bonds were used and given to the bank in 
exchange for NPLs.    KAMCO did not issue bonds to the market.     
 
<Objective> 
Korean Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) was originally established 
based on Article 53, paragraph 3 of the Korea Development Bank (KDB) Act   53
on April 6, 1962. Its primary role was to manage bad loans of the State-run 
Korean Development Bank under the control of Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MOFE).   
 
On November 24, 1997, KAMCO was reestablished to expand its role. New 
KAMCO was launched to set up NPL Management Fund. The Fund was 
created to acquire, manage and dispose of NPLs for the financial sector 
restructuring. One of the important functions of KAMCO was to purchase 
distressed assets from banks and other financial institutions with public fund.  
In November 2002, KAMCO stopped purchasing NPLs from financial 
institutions. The goal of public fund injection is to recover brokerage function 
in the financial sector as well as international credibility.   In the long run, it 




KAMCO’s primary roles are: (1) management and operation of Non- 
Performing Loans management Fund, (2) acquisition and resolution of 
Non-performing assets from financial institutions, (3) implementation of 
work-out programs for acquired distressed companies, and (4) management of 
state-owned properties and resolution of tax arrears. KAMCO decides the 
time for acquisition, the size of assets, acquisition approach and purchase rate 
of NPLs according to the restructuring plan by the government. KAMCO 
purchases assets according to the fair market value.   
 
The Non-performing Asset Management Fund (NPA Fund) was introduced on 
November 24, 1997. This Fund was organized to support financial 
restructuring by efficiently resolving NPLs of financial institution in the wake 
of the unprecedented financial crisis.  The NPA Fund was used to purchase 
NPLs from financial institutions and helped financial institutions clean up 
operations by taking the burden of NPLs away from them. By December 2001, 
KAMCO had used a total of W21.6 trillion in funds raised. Of the initial Public 
Fund raised for financial restructuring (W64 trillion), W20.5 trillion was 
raised by issuing KAMCO bonds, and W0.5 trillion was borrowed from Korean 
Development Bank, and other 0.6 trillion was acquired through borrowings 






The initial size of the NPA Fund was W10 trillion. KAMCO finances itself by 
issuing W32.5 trillion worth of its own bonds and by disposing purchased 
assets through direct sale of these assets or of asset-backed securities. 
According to the projected plan, KAMCO had to purchase NPLs amounting to 
over W50 trillion.21 The Government had guaranteed the KAMCO bond 
without assuming responsibilities for interest payments until 2002. The cost 
of interest payment was expected to decrease greatly with a sharp drop in 
interest rates, and the Government would bear interest costs from 2003. 
 
As one of the NPL resolution measures, KAMCO issued domestic ABS bond 
secures by restructured corporate loans purchased from selling institutions 
(insolvent companies). KAMCO bought them from creditor banks. KAMCO’s 
ABS structure is as follows.22 
 
                                                 
21 KDIC issued W31.5 trillion worth of bonds for equity participation and for compensation of the 
differential between liabilities and assets 
22 We are grateful to Je-Chul Yoon, Executive Director/CPA at KAMCO, for a detailed explanation 
on KAMCO’s ABS structure. 
Figure 7-1: KAMCO NPLs Disposition
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KAMCO transfered NPLs to SPC (Special Purpose Company), and SPC 
evaluated the assets. After credit enhancement, KAMCO issued the ABS. 
KAMCO originated 15 times of ABS, and out of 14 were backed-up by Special 
Loans (or Restructured Corporate Loans) which underwent the Civil Courts 
restructuring process. The repayment schedule was fixed and approved by the 
Court. KAMCO has once originated ABS backed-up by secured Ordinary 





                                                 
23 KAMCO web page, http://www.kamco.or.kr/eng/area/main2.htmd, describes the key features of 
KAMCO’s ABS with put-back option as follows:   
“One of the noticeable features of KAMCO's ABS is, despite the fact that they are backed by 
nonperforming loans, when borrowers of the nonperforming loans fail to make payments according to 
the payment schedule, the financial institutions which originally sold the loans to KAMCO buy back 
the loans. And if the SPC (Special Purpose Company) suffer temporary shortage of financial resources 
in making principal and interest payment, the National Housing and Commercial Bank, KAMCO's 
trustee for the MIRAE bond 99-2 extends credit line accordingly. “ 
According to one KAMCO official, “Even for the ABS backed by Special Loans with put back option, 
original lender bank do not buy back the NPLs merely when the interest on ABS is late or is not to be 
paid, they buy back only when the debtor company fails to repay the interest or principal as scheduled. 
When SPC encounters shortage of money to repay to ABS holder, regardless the debtor of NPLs 
defaults or not, the trustee bank subrogates according to the trustee agreement.”   
However, there still remain some unclear points. The structure of redemptive ABS issuance does not 
seem to lessen the financial institutions’ NPL burden because, in case of default in payments, it’s not 
only KAMCO, but the lender bank that have to buy back NPLs. Then, it is not obvious if the 
KAMCO’s acquisition of NPLs and issuance of ABS does clear FI's balance sheets of NPLs and 





KAMCO had three types of assets in its inventory: Ordinary loans, 
Restructured corporate loans, and Workout loans. 
 
Ordinary loans were currently in default for three months or longer, whether 
they were secured or unsecured (regardless of the existence of security 
(collateral)).    
 
Restructured corporate loans were those that had obtained court approvals of 
restructuring as part of corporate re-organization or composition proceedings 
regardless of existence of security (collateral). The important distinction 
between Ordinary loans and Restructured corporate loans lied in the 
collection procedure of the loans. Most of the obligators of Restructured Loans 
were initially considered as viable with temporary liquidity problems. 
Therefore, when KAMCO initially purchased these loans, the original lenders 
were not entitled to declare default or execute their claims through the 
Table 7-1: ABS Issuance*
(in billions of Won)
Face Value Purchasing P Amount
June 15 1999 305.1 268 320
Aug 30 1999 384.9 299.6 360
Nov 9 1999 237.7 201.9 223
Dec 27 1999 291.5 221.7 265
Jan 19 2000 365.6 337 340
Apr 3 2000 320.7 342.5 330
Apr 27 2000 414 367 375
July 19 2000 495.2 194.4 257
July 22 2000 361.6 311.2 346
July 28 2000** 440.9 444.2 468.8
Sep 7 2000 402.1 337.2 378
Dec 12 2000 221.6 182 218
Dec 29 2000 395.5 344 404
Aug 17 2001 213.3 165.8 229.9
Dec 4 2001 264.4 193.6 284
Total 5114.1 4210.1 4798.7
Source: Korea Asset Management Corporation, Annual Report, 2001
* Set on the basis of contract amount.
** Foreign currency denominated ABS  57
foreclosure. This was due to the current and existing repayments of the loans 
according to the rescheduled payment schedules. Thus, in valuing the 
Restructured Loans, more emphasis has been given to the credit standing of 
the borrower.   
 
Workout corporate loans were Daewoo-related loans covering corporate bonds, 
CPs, and foreign loans issued by the Daewoo Group in line with its 
restructuring. They were restructured by each institution (out of court). 

























Table 7-2: KAMCO loan classification
Collateral Secured Unsecured
Court Approval
Ordinary  Loans currently in default for Loans currently in default for
Loans 3 months or longer 3 months or longer
Restructured Loans to companies under  Loans to companies under 
Corporate Loans court reorganization court  reorganization 
Workout Corporate loans         Restructured out of court (under private workout programs)














Table7-3: Acquisition and Resolution of NPLs by type of Loans since November 1997
(as of June 30, 2002, in trillion won)
             Purchased            Resolved                 Balance
Classification Face  Purchase Face Purchase Face Purchase
value Price value Price value Price
Ordinary Loans 29.8 9.2 24 8.3 5.8 0.9
Restructured Corporate Loans 41.1 17.0 33.5 14.4 7.6 2.6
Workout Loans 34.5 13.2 2.3 1.6 32.2 11.6
TOTAL 105.4 39.4 59.8 24.3 45.6 15.1
Souce: KAMCO  60
 
<Purchase Price and Purchasing Process> 
KAMCO acquires assets from financial sector with purchase price by 
estimating potential market price based on its past experience in dealing with 
similar assets transaction.24 The purchase price of NPLs is based on price 
guideline, real property right, right of lease, and so on. When it is difficult to 
estimate the price in advance, the difference between purchasing price and 
sales price of NPLs can be settled later on. If the recent transaction prices 
reflect speculative factor rather than market condition, there is a high 
possibility that the estimated purchase price could be very different from the 
market price. 
 
The basic criteria of purchase price assessment for NPL is as follows. Secured 
loans are priced by adding or subtracting price fluctuations of collateral assets, 
from the recent average foreclosure auction rate and appraisal value. 
Unsecured loan is priced at 3% of the face value. The purchase prices of 
corporate restructured loan are calculated based on debt payment by court 
decision.  
 
KAMCO has the put-back options to the selling financial institutions for all 
loans (including Ordinary and Restructured) that KAMCO purchases from 
these institutions.     
 
The purchase prices had been decided by the Government until 1999. From 
2000, no instruction on purchase price was given by the Government. In the 
process of purchasing NPLs from financial institutions, KAMCO presented to 
financial institutions the purchase prices on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Since 
the price is based on the criteria, as mentioned above, and publicly available 
for every institution, there is no room to bring the price up for selling 
                                                 
24 The reasonable purchasing price should be calculated with the expected future cash flow 
discounted at an appropriate rate. This net present value (NPV) is, however, difficult to evaluate since 
it depends on the future cash flow and a reasonable discount rate of each NPLs.  Besides, there are 
limits in evaluating distressed loans on the basis of all kinds of market information since KAMCO 
does not acquire NPLs from public auction.       
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institutions. Financial institutions can sell their assets to foreign investors 
directly as well as to KAMCO.   
 
There is no loss sharing agreement between KAMCO and the financial 
institutions that sold the loans. KAMCO is responsible for all and any loss 
that may be generated. As previously mentioned, however, KAMCO has the 
put-back option on all loans that it purchased from the financial institutions. 
 
 
7.1 Purchase of NPLs 
KAMCO started its acquisition of NPLs from financial institutions in 
November 1997. By the end of 2001, the total NPLs purchased by KAMCO 
amounted to W38.7 trillion. It was 27.8% of the accumulated public funds 
from 1997-2001 injected through KDIC, BOK, Government and KAMCO.   
 
As of December 1997, the face value of NPLs bought by KAMCO amounted to 
W11.0 trillion, of which W8.4 billion from banks and W2.6 trillion from 
merchant  banks.  The  total  purchase amount was W7.1 trillion.   
 
In 1998, KAMCO continued to purchase NPLs from financial institutions. 
KAMCO acquired the face value of W32.8 trillion of NPLs as of the end of 
1998. The total purchase amount was W12.3 trillion.  Most of these NPLs 
(92%, or W30 trillion in face value) purchased by KAMCO was from banks. 
The total face value of NPLs purchased by KAMCO from other financial 
institutions was about W3.0 trillion, whereas W27 trillion of NPLs remained 
in non-banks and other institutions as of December 1998. This means that the 
remaining NPLs, 9 times as much as those acquired by KAMCO, were 
managed by individual institutions.     
 
In 1999, KAMCO acquired W4.5 trillion of NPLs (the face value of W18.3 
trillion) from banks and financial institutions. In 2000, the face value of NPLs 
acquired by KAMCO amounted to W33 trillion and their purchase amount 
was W12.9 trillion. In 2001, KAMCO purchased NPLs of W1.9 trillion, whose 
face value was W6.0 trillion.    From 2002 to 2004, KAMCO purchased NPLs 
of more than W8.5 trillion. 
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The face value of NPLs bought by KAMCO from November 1997 to April 2005 
was about W110 trillion, and the total purchase amount was about W40 
trillion.  
 
Table 7-4: Acquisition of NPLs by KAMCO
(billions of Won)












Souce: KAMCO, Business Report  
 
 
<Purchase Breakdown by type of institution> 
Since the first acquisition of NPLs from financial institutions in November 
1997, KAMCO had purchased NPLs amounting to W38.7 trillion by the end of 
2001. Most of NPLs acquired by KAMCO was from banks: they were in 
relation to mergers and liquidation in banks. KAMCO also purchased NPLs 
from Non-banks, securities and Insurance companies, etc.   
 
In November 26, 1997, KAMCO purchased W3.0 trillion (Face value of W4.4 
trillion) of NPLs of Seoulbank and Korea First Bank, two of the big-five 
commercial banks in Korea.  On November 28 and December 15, 1997, 
KAMCO acquired NPLs from commercial banks and merchant banks. The 
face value of NPLs acquired by KAMCO in 1997 was W11.1 trillion. As of 
December 1997, KAMCO had acquired W7.1 trillion of NPLs from financial 
institutions. 
 
In 1998, NPLs acquired by KAMCO amounted to W12 trillion with face value 
of W33 trillion. On September 29, 1998, KAMCO acquired NPLs with their 
face value of W23 trillion from 23 banks and other 2 institutions, at the 
purchase value of W9.0 trillion. KAMCO also acquired NPLs from Seoulbank,   63
KFB, 5 specialized banks, Kwangju and Jeonbuk Banks, and other financial 
institutions, amounting to face value of W10 trillion, with the purchase value 
of  W3.2  trillion.   
 
In 1999, KAMCO acquired the face value of W18.3 trillion of NPLs from 
financial institutions. The purchased amount of NPLs in 1999 was relatively 
small compared to that in the previous year of 1998 or the following year. The 
purchased amount of NPLs from KFB and Seoulbank was the largest: the face 
value of NPLs was W4.4 trillion from KFB and W 4.6 trillion from Seoulbank. 
 
In 2000, KAMCO acquired NPLs of the face value amounting to W33 trillion 
from the financial system, of which W26.7 trillion was the loan rights of 
Daewoo Bank Group. The amount of removal of these NPLs from the Daewoo 
Group accounted for 81% of the total face value of NPLs removed from the 
banking sector in 2000. The purchase amount was W11.4 trillion, 88% of total 
NPLs acquired by KAMCO in that year. On December 29,KAMCO made a 
large purchase of NPLs with face value of W2.4 trillion (purchase amount of 
W84 billion) of financial institutions restructured by KDIC, in addition to 
NPLs related to KFB, PBK, Cheju Bank and Daewoo Secured CP bought by 
KAMCO amounted to W1.2 trillion (face value).   
 
In 2001, KAMCO purchased NPLs from financial institutions amounting to 
W2.0 trillion with face value of 6.0 trillion. Most of NPLs purchased by 
KAMCO was from banks and the Daewoo Group.     
 
The total purchase value of NPLs by KAMCO from 1997 to the end of 2001 
was W38.7 trillion, about one third of the face value of W101.2 trillion. The 
NPLs of banking sector decreased to W15.5 trillion (2.8%) by the end of 2001. 
The acquisition by KMACO may be a potential cause for the large decline in 
NPL ratio in banks. However, the NPLs and NPL-ratio in the non-bank and 
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Table 7-5: Purchase of NPLs by Type of Institutions, November 1997-April 2005
(in billions of US dollar)
Loan Purchase         Purchase Price
Amount Price            Ratio (%)
Commercial Banks 62.07 24.71 39.81
Merchant Banks 3.51 1.54 43.87
Investment Trust 7.06 1.75 24.79
Insurance companies 22.45 8.39 37.37
Foreign Financial Institutions 5.12 2.13 41.60
others 10.55 1.21 11.47
Total 110.76 39.73 35.87
Souce: KAMCO, Business Report  
   65
 
Table 7-6: KAMCO Purchase of NPLs by type of institution, 1997-2001
Year 1997 (billions of Won)
Date Financial Institutions Face Value Purchase Amount
Nov 26 1997 KFB and Seoul Bank 4394.3 2910.3
Nov 28 1997 30 Merchant Banks 2698.8 1755.5
Dec 15 1997 30 Commercial Banks 3951.0 2474.3
Total 11062.4 7136.2
Year 1998 (billions of Won)
Date Financial Institutions Face Value Purchase Amount
Feb 19 1998 2 Guarantee Insurance Companies(GIC) 2816.6 412.1
July 23 1997 Seoul Bank 1040.0 498.9
July 31 1998 KFB 1133.5 606.6
Sep 29 1998 23 Banks and 2 GIC 23031.6 9085.0
Nov 6 1998 Kwangju and jeonbuk Banks/Securities a 496.9 261.6
Dec 29 1998 5 Special Banks 4530.8 1903.0
Total 32831.9 12255.3
Year 1999 (billions of Won)
Date Financial Institutions Face Value Purchase Amount
Feb 12 1999 Chohung Bank 87.6 42.8
March 31 1999 Chungbuk Bank 7.8 2.5
May 19 1999 5 Acquiring Banks 1751.4 280.4
June 30 1999 Koram Bank 23.7 8.3
June 30 1999 Mutual Finance and Savings 187.3 105.1
July 8 1999 KFB 4362.4 897.0
July 31 1999 Hugkook Life Insurance 1.0 -
Sep 17 1999 Seoul Bank 4559.3 1154.3
Oct 8 1999 Kangwon Bank 179.0 72.6
Oct 21 1999 5 Acquiring Banks 180.7 46.5
Oct 26 1999 6 Regional Banks 480.5 223.8
Dec 20 1999 5 Commercial Banks 114.9 35.8
Total 18289.0 4464.4
Year 2000 (billions of Won)
Date Financial Institutions Face Value Purchase Amount
Jan 29 2000 DAEWOO Loans from 23 ITCs 18478.8 6407.4
March 18 2000 5 Acquiring Banks 99.0 37.0
June 20 2000 8 Mutual Finance & Savings 23.0 19.8
Aug 3 2000 Seoul Guarantee Insurance Company 1135.8 299.7
Oct 31 2000 Daewoo Secured CP 2431.3 1952.3
Oct 31 2000 Daewoo Foreign Debt 4302.1 1840.9
Nov 9 2000 Daewoo Foreign Debt 31.8 26.4
Nov 30 2000 Daewoo Secured CP 366.9 294.6
Dec 29 2000 KFB/PBK/Cheju Bank 130.1 54.2
Dec 29 2000 FIs restructured by KDIC 2396.4 84.0
Dec 29 2000 Daewoo Secured CP 1121.9 900.9
Dec 30 2000 NPLs related to Daewoo Motors Co. 399.9 170.1





7.2 Disposition of NPLs 
KAMCO disposed NPLs according to the basic principle of selling at the 
highest price possible. However, it was difficult for KAMCO to decide when to 
sell the acquired NPLs in order to maximize the gains, while it would be 
achieved without delay. Loans that could be sold in an early stage take only 
small parts of the whole NPLs that KAMCO had acquired. Most of NPLs were 
under legal supervision of the court or in the process of the settlement.   
 
For the asset targeted for immediate sales, KAMCO used such measures as 
(1) Portfolio sales (international auction), (2) Securitization (ABS),    (3) Public 
auction, (4) Court auction (foreclosure), and (5) Individual Loan sales. When 
an asset could not be sold at present condition, the agency tried to improve the 
asset value through a value adding process and sold later at a reasonable 
price. Besides, even if the assets could not be sold at a present condition and 
could not be improved either, the agency set a rule to dispose of them as early 
as possible even at a lower price.   
 
For efficient disposition of NPLs, KAMCO set priority on selling its assets 
through international auction, then later by Securitization (ABS) in order.     
Table 7-6 (continued)
Year 2001 (billions of Won)
Date Financial Institutions Face Value Purchase Amount
Jan 5 2001 Seoul Bank  750.8 364.8
Jan 5 2001 18 Mutual Finance & Savings 103.1 47.9
Jan 16 2001 Kwangju Bank 25.6 17.3
Feb 15 2001 NPLs related to Daewoo Mortors 1545.1 668.3
Feb 16 2001 6 Mutual Finance & Savings 11.5 5.3
March 29 2001 KEB, Hanvit, Daegu Bank 609.1 222.8
June 28 2001 Seoul Bank & 7 Banks 533.0 77.3
June 29 2001 Daewoo Foreign Debt 190.7 61.7
Sep 14 2001 KDB & 6 banks 497.5 197.1
Dec 24 2001 Hanvit Bank & 17 Banks 430.3 134.3
Total 6002.4 1963.8
Total (billions of Won)
Face Value Purchase Amount
1997-2000 95158.2 36775.1
1997-2001 101160.6 38738.9
Source: KAMCO, Business Report.  67
 
KAMCO collected USD22.8 billion of the total face value of W58.5 trillion 
disposed NPLs through international auction, ABS Issuance, Court Auction 
and the others on September 30, 2002. The Purchase price of disposed NPLs 
was USD20.0 billion. The recovery rate of the NPLs disposition, the ratio of 
recovery value to the face value, was about 46%. 
  
Excluding the Repurchase and Cancellation, the total face value of disposed 
NPLs amounted to USD34.6 billion. The purchase price of these disposed 
NPLs was USD12.3 billion and the sales amount was USD15 billion. The 
recovery rate, the ratio of the recovery value to the face amount (excluding 
repurchase and cancellation) of the disposed NPLs, was about 44.6%. 
 
<Equity Partnership> 
As one of the NPL disposition methods, the equity participation strategy was 
introduced as a joint venture partnership between KAMCO (the public) and 
the private sectors. The equity partnership strategy was designed to improve 
the expected amount of recovery from NPL sales, by covering the upside risk.  
When NPLs with uncertainty was sold, the method of sharing the upside risk 
would be better than outright sale.   
 
The equity partnership involved three organizations: Asset Management 
Company (AMC), Corporate Restructuring Company (CRC), and Corporate 
restructuring vehicle (CRV). 
 
I. Asset Management Company (AMC) 
AMC aims at having a comprehensive asset management function.  The 
details of its function include management and collection of loans that 
controls cash flow concerning the secured and unsecured debt, rental, sale and 
management of real estate, and enhancement of asset value including real 
estate. The major operation of AMC is to conduct workout programs 
(debt-to-equity swaps, debt rescheduling, and debt reduction) and to enhance 
asset value of real estate.   
 
KAMCO pools assets for international bid and awards the bidder (investor) 
who has submitted the highest bid price through an open limited competitive   68
international bidding. The winner of the bid purchases 50% share of the SPC 
by cash payment commensurate to 50% of NPLs (receive an investment 
certificate). The ownership between KAMCO and the investor of the SPC is 
50:50 respectably. The pooled assets are turned over to the SPC whether it is 
established on or off shore as long as it is in conformity with the Asset Backed 
Securitization Law.   
 
According to the percentage interest of the shareholder, the profit sharing and 
rights of the remaining property gets distributed pro rate in accordance to the 
percentage of shares in SPC, while the investor company has the managerial 
right to the SPC (General Partner)   
 
KAMCO established 3 joint venture-AMCs with foreign investment 
companies. On December 21, 1999, Deutsche Bank and Samsung Life 
Insurance Consortium was selected as the first AMC partner. On May 9, 2000, 
Morgan-Stanley became the 2nd and 3rd AMC partner. KAMCO selected 
Colony Capital as the winning bidder of the 4th JV-AMC, international bid on 
June 20, 2001. Another JV-AMC was established with Colony Capital by 
October 25, 2001. 
 
 
II. Joint Venture Corporate Restructuring Company (CRC)   
The Korean government conformed the "CRC Act" under the Industry of 
Development Act of Korea. Ministry of Finance Economy (MOFE) had loan to 
Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) from the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) Financial Sector Program Loan (FSPL), in the aggregated 
principal amount of USD$ 500million for the purpose of establishing one or 
more Corporate Restructuring Companies (CRCs).   
  
The total Capital Commitment amounted to USD900 million, and USD 270 
million for each CRC (KAMCO:Foreign Investor = 50:50). Equity Share 
between KAMCO (General partner) and foreign investor (Limited Partner) is 
50:50. Investment Period is 3 years from signing the Investment Agreement. 
  
CRCs focus on acquisition/disposition of non-performing loans, lending a loan 
to distressed company, securitization and restructuring the troubled   69
companies. The major operation scope of a CRC is to acquire, normalize, and 
dispose a target company by taking over the management. 
 
KAMCO established 3 Joint venture-CRCs with the foreign investment 
companies in 2000. On February 23, Joint Venture CRC Partnership with 
Lehman Brothers was established (KAMCO-LB). On March 23, Joint Venture 
CRC Partnership with Sonnenblick Goldman was established (KAMCO-SG). 
On September 28, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter was established. MSDW was 
selected as a 3rd JV-CRC partner. 
 
On May 23, KAMCO auctioned off W610.3 billion (book value) of NPLs to 
KAMCO-LB and W946.7 billion (book value) of NPLs to KAMCO-SG Investor 
Inc. on September 28, respectively.   
 
 
III. Corporate Restructuring Vehicle (CRV) 
Following the introduction of vulture funds and corporate restructuring 
companies to the local market, the legal framework for Corporate 
Restructuring Vehicle (CRV) was set up. The corporate Restructuring Vehicle 
(CRV) is a paper company. CRVs are intended to help creditor banks and 
other lenders improve their capital position by enabling them to transfer 
non-performing loans to workout firms into the hands of specialized private 
sector asset management entities and remove them from their balance sheets.   
 
A CRV collects NPLs held by creditor banks and workout companies and 
normalizes the operation of companies subject to reorganization by entrusting 
management of assets to a professional asset management company. Unlike 
the existing restructuring vehicles, a CRV gathers the loans of workout 














Table 7-8: Disposition(Resolution) of NPLs, As of April 30, 2005
(in billions of U.S. Dollars)
Face Purchase Recovery Ratio*
value price Value (%)
International Auction 6.1 1.3 1.6 8.39
ABS Issuance 8.4 4.4 4.7 11.55
Sale to AMC** 2.50 0.7 0.9 3.44
Sale to CRC** 1.90 0.4 0.7 2.61
Individual loan Sale 3.40 0.8 1.4 4.68
Court Auction etc. 8.60 2.8 3.5 11.83
Collection 15.1 4.8 6.8 20.77
Daewoo 6.9 4.3 5.9 9.49
Sub-Total 52.9 19.5 25.5 72.76
Recourse & Cancellation 19.8 10.3 10.3 27.24
Total 72.7 29.8 35.8 100.00
source: KAMCO, Business Report
*Face value /total disposed face value of NPLs
** Equity partnership  
 
 
Table 7-7: Disposition(Resolution) of NPLs, As of December 31, 2000
(in billions of Won)
Face Purchase Selling
value price price
International Auction 6062.1 1311.7 1599.6
ABS 8016.4 4218.1 4140.6
Individual loan Sale 1266 279.0 394.1
AMC* 2566.6 655.1 919.2
CRC* 1841 364.4 673
Court Auction etc. 8085.1 2460.6 3006.5
Direct Recovery 6995.9 1812.4 2876.9
Repayment by the approved plan 2126.7 1274.9 1551.9
CRV 511.6 112.6 169.6
Daewoo debt-equity swap 1741 979.7 615.1
Recovery from Daewoo repayment 1396.2 1214.1 1396.2
Sub-Total 40608.8 14682.6 17342.5
Repurchase & Cancellation 17877.7 9556.6 9556.6
Total 58486.5 24239.2 26899.1
source: KAMCO, Annual Report 2001
* Equity partnership  71
<Portfolio Sale> 
As a portfolio sale, KAMCO conducted two types of international auction: 
International Bidding for Corporate Restructured Loans and International 
Bidding for Secured Loans. Loans offered by KAMCO was not only for the 
bulk purchase by one investor, but also for small transactions.  Loans took 
the form of mixed asset pool type and each asset pool was sold by individual 
purchaser.   
 
<International Bidding for Corporate Restructured Loans> 
KAMCO conducted four international auctions for Corporate Restructured 
Loans from 1998 to 2000. The first international auction was held in 
September 1998. It completed its first sale of non-performing loans having a 
face value of approximately W207.5 billion to Goldman Sachs, the highest 
bidder in the auction. The sales price of the NPLs was W25.4 billion, while the 
purchase amount was W2.8 billion. The NPLs sold to Goldman Sachs were 
made by debtor-creditor contract. The upside profit sharing was: KAMCO: 
Goldman Sachs = 60 : 40.   
 
In May 1999, KAMCO completed its international auction through the sale of 
a portfolio of non-performing restructured corporate loans to two major 
investors, Goldman Sachs Consortium and Morgan Stanley Consortium, 
which consisted of two local (Korean) investors, Hyundai Investment Trust & 
Securities Co. Ltd. This was the first sale in that the Korean investor 
participated to bid in a series of international auctions by KAMCO. The 
successful bidders agreed to purchase loans from KAMCO, offered in three 
separate pools, for prices ranging between 16 to 18% (average of 16.03%) of 
the outstanding principal value. The outstanding face value of the assets sold 
by KAMCO was W772 billion, which included loans to 120 corporate 
borrowers. The sale price of the assets was W124 billion, whereas KAMCO 
paid W72 billion of the purchasing price.     
 
In November 1999, KAMCO completed its third auction through the sale of a 
portfolio of non-performing Restructured Corporate Loan to three different 
groups of investors. The successful bidders included Goldman Sachs-GE 
Capital Consortium, Morgan Stanley-Ceberus Tongyang, and Central 
Banking Corp. They agreed to purchase the loan from KAMCO, offered in   72
seven separate pools, for prices ranging from 6.24% to 23.05% (average of 
21.02%).  
 
In July 2000, KAMCO completed the sale of non-performing restructured 
corporate loans to three foreign investors and one individual investment 
corporation. The winning bidders were Goldman Sachs Asia LLC, Morgan 
Stanley Asia Ltd, Lone Star. 
 
Among four international biddings for corporate restructured loans since 
September 1998, only one (the first international bid in September 1998) was 
with upside profit sharing rules. The other three biddings were outright sales, 
sometimes accompanied by put-back options to entice investors occasionally. 
In the outright sales, purchaser received all rights and interests in the loans 
KAMCO had prior to sale, and KAMCO received the purchase price.   
 
 
<International Bidding for Secured Loans> 
KAMCO conducted international auction for Secured Loan three times from 
1998 to 1999. In December 1998, KAMCO completed the first secured-NPLs 
sale in the international auction. The winning bidder was Lonestar Fund of 
US. The face value of the assets was W565 billion, and Lonestar Fund and 
KAMCO agreed to sell and purchase the portfolio for about 36% of the 
outstanding principal balance, W201 billion. The winning bidder Lonestar 
Fund agreed to pay KAMCO approximately W141 billion (70% of the 
purchasing price) in an offshore special purpose vehicle (SPV)--the transaction 
was structured as a sale of equity in an offshore special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
KAMCO retained 30% interest in the SPV allowing it to participate in the 





















Table 7-9: International Bidding for Corporate Restructured Loans*
(in billions of Won)
Face Purchase Selling       Profit Sharing Investor
Value Price Price     KAMCO: Investor
Sep 1 1998 207.5 2.8 25.4               60:40 Goldman Sachs
May 27 1999 772.4 71.7 123.8         outright sale Goldman Sachs & others
Nov 10 1999 811.2 97.7 170.5         outright sale Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & others
July 26 2000 1097.5 228.9 322.8         outright sale Goldman Sachs & others
Total 2888.6 401.1 642.5
Source: Korea Asset Management Corporation, Annual Report, 2001 and Business Report.
















Table 7-10: International Bidding for Secured Loans*
(in billions of Won)
Face Purchase Selling       Profit Sharing Investor
Value Price Price     KAMCO: Investor
Dec 9 1998 564.6 238.8 201.2               40:60 Lonestar Fund
Jun 22 1999 1038.8 554.5 525.9         outright sale Lonestar Fund
Dec 8 1999 1022.6 379.6 439.3         outright sale Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Total 2626.0 1172.9 1166.4
Source: Korea Asset Management Corporation, Annual Report, 2001 and Business Report.
* Set on the basis of contract amount.  76
 
<Summary> 
The size of NPLs was a soft, moving target. It changes according to the 
standard of loan classification and to the change in economic conditions. 
Under stricter standards, NPLs were estimated bigger. The international 
standard became effective on July 1, 1999.  As of the end of June 1998, FSC 
estimated that NPLs, including precautionary and internationally-defined 
substandard loans, amounted to W197 trillion, of which precautionary credit 
was W79 trillion, and credit that was substandard and lower was W118 
trilliion. 
 
Given that NPLs amounted to W200 trillion roughly, by international 
standards, public funds of W32.5 trillion were insufficient to deal with all the 
NPLs of financial institutions. Although the acquisition of NPLs did help 
decrease NPLs in Banks and Merchant Banks, NPL ratio in other financial 
institutions remained very high. The Government should have either 
increased the funds or used the allotted funds in a different way for a more 
efficient resolution. However, the amount the government allotted was clearly 
large in proportion of the GDP.   
 
KAMCO remained as the sole asset management company in the country. 
Although it has been very active in purchasing and reorganizing NPLs, it has 
not escaped criticism, especially with respect to the disposition of the NPL 
through international auction. Most of the biddings until 2000 were outright 
sale, not with upside profit sharing rules. But this problem was rectified when 
equity partnership was introduced in 1998.   
 
The evolution of the methods of KAMCO sales offered a lesson to other asset 
management companies. It is preferable for an asset management company to 
devise a framework that is transparent and fair aution/bidding inviting 
various types of investors so that expected recovery of values from NPLs can 
be maximized.  The details of KAMCO auctions described above show that 
having a method to share upside risk is important.  Outright sales in the 
midst of a crisis often resutls in low sales prices, and they can be criticized 
domestically as fire sales.  On the other hand, hanging on to assets with an 
expectation of better markets is most likely to end up in deteriorated asset   77
values in months.  This was the case in the earlier attempts of sales of 
KAMCO assets, especially restructured banks.  Instead, securitized sales of 
NPLs is one way to achieve sharing upside risk with investors.     
 
KAMCO stopped purchasing NPLs in November 2002, in view of improved 
condition of the overall banking sector. The role of New KAMCO will be 
shifted from the current NPL management of the crisis period to the 
consolidation of banking system during peacetime. 
 
 
Table 7-11: Recovery and Disposition of NPLs, at the end of 2003
(in billions of Won)
Acquired NPLs 110.5
Disposed Purchased price 28.3









8. Korea Deposit Insurance corporation (KDIC) 
The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) was established on June 1, 
1996. The primary aim of the KDIC is the protection of depositors: the KDIC 
initiated the deposit insurance operations for almost all the financial 
institutions on January 1, 1997. Its major functions include the operation of 
the Deposit Insurance Fund, collection of insurance premiums, payment of 
insurance claims, resolution of failed financial institutions and provision of 
financial assistance. The KDIC does not have supervisory power over the 
institutions, although it has limited joint inspection power with FSS. 
 
8.1 Deposit Insurance System 
<Deposit Insurance> 
Prior to the establishment of KDIC in 1996, Korea lacked an explicit and 
formal deposit protection system for banking institutions. Instead, it was 
commonly believed that the government would guarantee bank deposits in   78
some ways. In the event of failure or insolvency, the government intervened to 
resolve the problem and protect depositors. In fact, no Korean bank had ever 
been closed before 1997. For non-banking financial institutions, trust funds 
had deposit insurance function. Life and non-life insurance companies utilized 
the Insurance Guarantee Fund, and the Securities Investor Protection Fund 
served that role for securities companies. Mutual savings & finance 
companies, merchant banks and investment brokerage houses employed the 
Credit Management Fund.   
Amid the advance in the liberalization of financial markets, the 
accessibility to become more pertinent, generating concerns about the 
possibility of prevalent bank failures. In considerations of these concerns, 
the government enacted the Depositor Protection Act on December 29, 1995 
and established the KDIC in the following June.25  The Depositor Protection 
Act was revised at the end of 1997 and, accordingly, the previously-separate 
deposit insurance funds for non-bank financial institutions were integrated 
under the management of the KDIC in April 1998. Consequentially, all 
industry-specific deposit insurance funds were consolidated into the Korea 
Deposit Insurance Corporation by April 1, 1999. Deposits to be protected by 
the KDIC included not only bank deposits, but also deposits held in 
securities companies, insurance companies, merchant banks, mutual 
savings and finance companies, and credit unions.   
 
<Insured Financial Institutions> 
The insured financial institutions are those required to subscribe to deposit 
insurance coverage from the KDIC and those remit deposit insurance 
premiums to the KDIC. In terms of banks, commercial banks, regional banks, 
domestic branches of foreign bank, specialized banks26, and regional branches 
of the National Federations are under the protection scope of the KDIC. All 
domestic securities and stock brokerage companies and insurance companies, 
including domestic branches of foreign securities companies, are also 
protected by the KDIC. Merchant banks and mutual savings & finance 
                                                 
25 Initially, the KDIC embarked upon the task of deposit insurance for banks in January 1997, while 
the separate funds for each respective non-bank financial institution remained in place. 
26  Excluding the Export-import Bank of Korea.   79
companies can obtain protection from the KDIC after being approved under 
the pertinent laws and acknowledged as KDIC insurable financial institutions. 
The number of insured financial institutions as of the end of 2003 is 
summarized below.   
 
Table 8-1: Insured Financial Institutions, as of December 31, 2003
Financial Institutions Domestic Foreign Others Total
Banks 18 40 0 58
Merchant Banks 2
Non-Bank Mutual Ssavings  114
Credit Unions 1086
Insurance Life Insurance 23
Companies Non-life Insurance 20
Securities Securities Companies 58
Total 1361
Source: KDIC  
 
 
8.2 Deposit Insurance Protection Limits 
The insurance coverage was W20 million per individual depositor at the 
establishment of KDIC in 1996. Due to the instability of the financial market 
resulting from the Asian currency and financial crisis of 1997, the coverage 
was expanded to blanket guarantee, following the amendment to the 
Enforcement Decree in December 1997. This de facto removal of the protection 
limit was in part successful to stabilize the market for the extremely 
turbulent times. However, as the concerns of moral hazards became apparent, 
the Enforcement Decree was amended in July 1998 to limit coverage and 
subsequently, protection per individual depositor under the system of partial 
protection was re-adjusted up to W50 million through the amendment of the 
Enforcement Decree in October 2000.     
 
Before January 1, 2001, the coverage of deposit protection was classified into 
two. For the accounts opened (purchased) before August 1, 1998, both the 
principal and interests was covered in full. Deposits and new accounts that 
were opened on or after August 1, 1998 were covered up to W20 million if the 
sum of principal and interests was less than or equal to W20 million. If the 
principal exceeded W20 million, only the principal was covered up to W20 
million. From January 1, 2001, the deposit protection was expanded up to   80
W50 million for the sum of principal and interests. The coverage of deposit 
insurance is summarized in the table below. 
 
 
Table 8-2: Deposit Insurance Claim Payment Limitations
           Until December 31, 2000             From 
Accounts opend            Until             From    January 1, 2001
or purchased    July 31, 1998      August 1, 1998
   Principal and     Principal exceeds
  Interests: up to       W20 million
   W20 million
Banks; Securities       Principal &  Sum of Principal        Only Principal  Sum of Principal  
companies;          Interests:       & Interests:   (up to W20million)       & Interests: 
Merchant Banks;    Fully Covered.    Covered up to            Covered.    Covered up to  
Credit Unions     W20 million.      W50 million. 




8.3 Resolution of failed financial institutions 
The KDIC was also in charge of the resolution of failed financial institutions 
and provision of financial assistance. Failed financial institutions can be 
liquidated by the KDIC, making deposits payoffs to depositors. Otherwise, 
they can be assisted in merging or being taken over by sound financial 
institutions. The KDIC is entitled to arrange mergers or assignment of 
business between insured financial institution and failed financial 
institutions or acquisitions of failed financial institutions by a third party. 
 
In the case where a financial institution falls under a criteria, the KDIC may 
request the FSC to take necessary measures against the failed financial 
institution. And then the KDIC may provide financial assistance in 
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Table 8-3: KDIC financial support 
Banks and Insurance Companies (100 million of Won)
Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Banks 58132 109394 41307 57790 42738 4539 32785 52536
Insurance Companies - 51447 36750 11535 2474 2318 - - 3447
Securities Companies and Merchant Banks (100 million of Won)
Equity Participation Insurance Claim Payment
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Securities Companies - - 49000 140 4 -
Merchant Banks 421 - 14608 139738 - 13447
Source: KDIC  
 
 
Table 8-3: KDIC financial support (cont'd)
Banks and Insurance Companies (100 million of Won)
Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Banks 12543 - 662 31190 547 942 5961 6654 4561
Insurance Companies 71000.5 0.5 0 9561 868 4052 0 0 48
Securities Companies and Merchant Banks (100 million of Won)
Equity Participation Insurance Claim Payment
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Securities Companies 0 0 0 0 0 0
Merchant Banks 0 0 647 0 0 0
Source: KDIC  
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8.3.1 Financial Assistance to Banks 
<1998> 
On June 29, 1998, the FSC ordered the closure of five banks: Daedong, 
Donghwa, Dongnam, Kyunggi, and Chungchong banks. Five relatively 
healthier banks assumed the assets and liabilities of these exit-ordered banks 
and the KDIC provided financial support. Following the contract transfer 
decision, the Committee 27 laid down the criteria for the due diligence 
performed by the accounting firm. Taking the due diligence into consideration, 
the KDIC made a contribution up to W5.78 trillion to the five merger banks in 
September  1998.      
 
There was also a put back option if additional losses on assets were to occur 
during a certain time frame following the merger. Furthermore, to account for 
the lowered BIS capital adequacy ratios arising from the assumption of the 
exit-ordered banks’ assets, and to bring up the BIS ratio to levels at the end of 
June prior to the mergers, the KDIC made equity participation of W1.19 
trillion in December 1998. 
 
The KDIC also made equity participation in five other banks during the 
course of 1998. First, a total of W1.5 trillion was extended to Seoulbank and 
Korea First Bank to help raise their capital adequacy ratios. Second, in 
September 1998, the Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank, both 
ordered to reduce their capital stock according to the prompt corrective action 
put forward by the FSC, sought rehabilitation through merger and were 
recognized as failing financial institutions. Thus, the KDIC made a capital 
investment of W1.63 trillion to each bank respectively.   
 
In addition, following a revised due diligence by the FSC, Boram Bank’s low 
BIS capital adequacy ratio deemed it a failing financial institution. Therefore, 
Hana Bank’s merger with Boram bank was achieved by KDIC’s capital 
investment of W329 billion, preventing the deterioration of the merged bank’s 
capital adequacy level. 
 
                                                 
27  Comprising members from the KDIC, related banks, accounting firms and the Bank Supervisory 
Board.   83
<1999> 
In 1999, the KDIC made a capital investment of W10.9 trillion. It invested 
W2.1 trillion on February 18, 1999 in the CHB under the condition that the 
bank would consolidate with Kangwon Bank and Chungbuk Bank. 
Subsequently, the Kangwon Bank and the Chungbuk Bank invested W212.3 
billion and W393.3 billion, respectively, during their consolidation with the 
CHB. In total, W2.72 trillion was contributed in the consolidation process.   
 
In the case of Korea First Bank (KFB), a contract pertaining to its purchase by 
the Newbridge Capital took place on December 23, 1999 to achieve KFB’s 
normal operation and international credit rating improvement. The KDIC 
made a total of W4.2 trillion equity participation in 1999.28  
 
With respect to the Seoulbank, existing capital was written off to help 
facilitate a self-managed normalization as opposed to selling it to a foreign 
institution. To improve the BIS ratio, the KDIC contributed W3.32 trillion on 
September 18, 1999. Furthermore, the KDIC provided W4.3 trillion in the 




Capital injection made by the KDIC in 2000 amounted to W4.1 trillion: W2.76 
trillion in Hanvit Bank, W610.8 billion in Seoulbank, W273 billion in Peace 
Bank, W259 billion in Kyungnam Bank, in the form of equity participation.         
In total, the KDIC provided fund contribution of W453.9 billion and purchased 
W5.25 trillion of assets in banks in 2000. 
 
<2001-2003> 
Although the financial support to Banks made by KDIC between 2001 and 
2003 was relatively small compared to the amount from 1998 to 2000, a 
significant amount of capital was injected to banks. In total, more than W4.9 
                                                 
28  The KFB had been acquired by the KDIC. As a result of a partial equity write off of KFB 
stocks the Corporation had already owned and W4.2 trillion in additional contributions, the 
KDIC ended up with 45.92% ownership of KFB as of December 31,1999.   84
trillion was injected as equity participation, W720 billion as fund contribution, 
and W616 billion as asset purchase. 
 
8.3.2 Insurance Companies, Securities Companies and Merchant Banks 
<1998> 
At the end of 1998, resolution procedures were in progress for a total of 6 
securities companies that were ordered to close down operations or voluntarily 
wind up operations. Money deposited in two securities companies were repaid 
through the Securities Investors Protection Fund and payoff procedures on 
two other securities companies 
 
The KDIC provided a total of W925 billion in September 1998, to enable these 
merger companies to speed up their rehabilitation efforts. Following a 
complete due diligence, an additional W228.7 billion was extended as 
financial support.   
 
Mainly due to liquidity problems, 19 merchant banks were ordered to cease 
operations following December 1997.29 To make deposit payments, the KDIC 
provided a total of W12.7 trillion. 
 
<1999> 
On October 1, 1999, the KDIC provided W50 billion in the form of priority 
equity participation to Daehan Life Insurance Company. The KDIC 
additionally invested W2.0 trillion on November 25, 1999. With respect to 
Seoul Guarantee Insurance, which merged with Daehan and Korea 
Guarantee Insurance, the KDIC provided W1.25 trillion on June 24, 1999, in 
the form of equity participation. In total, the KDIC made equity participation 




In 2000, the KDIC provided W3.67 trillion to insurance companies in the form 
of equity participation. Of which, the KDIC injected additional funds of W3.4 
                                                 
29  Three merchant banks have been reopened while the remaining 16 have had their 
contracts transferred to Hanarum Merchant Bank.   85
trillion into Seoul Guarantee Insurance, which undertook vicarious payments 
on corporate bonds issued by the insolvent Daewoo Group.   
 
The KDIC also made fund contribution of W231.8 billion to insurance 
companies. Within the amount, the KDIC provided W58.7 billion to Korea Life 
Insurance concerning the P&A of Doowon Life Insurance.  The Corporation 
also acquired W344.7 billion worth of assets (real estate plus non-performing 
loans) through the resolution and finance corporation, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the KDIC. 
 
<2001-2003> 
Capital injection made by the KDIC in the form of equity participation 
between 2001 to 2003 to insurance companies amounted to W80.6 trillion, 
among which W71 trillion was injected to Korea life and to Seoul Guarantee.   
In addition to that, the KDIC provided fund contribution of W868 billion and 
purchased W410 billion of assets. 
 
 
As for Hans, Korea, Joongang, Youngnam Merchant Banks, whose operations 
were suspended in the second half of 2000, assets and liabilities were 
transferred to Hanaro Merchant Bank, a KDIC subsidiary that was solely 
established and capitalized by the KDIC in accordance with the Government’s 
restructuring plan for merchant banks dated October 20, 2000. The KDIC 
made insurance claim payments through the Hanareum Banking Corporation, 
a Resolution Financial Institution subsidiary of the Cooperation in respect of 
resolution processes concerning insolvent merchant banks, the KDIC provided 
a total of W14268 billion to Hanareum Banking Corporation by the end of 




Deposit insurance system was initially introduced in anticipation of the 
growing need of regulatory framework in case of bankruptcies and failures of 
financial institutions in the process of financial liberalization. In the wake of 
Asian currency and financial crisis of 1997, however, the Government decided 
to provide a blanket guarantee on deposits in order to restore depositors’   86
confidence after the IMF program was implemented. A wide range of financial 
products of all institutions was protected by the deposit insurance system. In 
order to lessen moral hazard problem of troubled financial institutions, the 
Government modified the coverage of deposit insurance from full to limited, 
maximum at W20 million in August 1998, and the coverage raised to W50 
million from January 2001.  Considering the insurance coverage in US and 
European countries, the coverage in Korea is too wide. 
 
It is obvious that the wide coverage by deposit insurance will end up in the 
implicit Government’s guarantee that leads to unhealthy management by 
banking institutions and contributes to insolvency.  Therefore, the 
Government should consider that the deposit insurance system meets global 
standards and decreases moral hazard by ensuring the following: the 
insurance should cover a limited range of financial products, and the 
operation of the system should be strict. This principle had been restored after 
the crisis management was over. By and large, the temporary adoption of 
blanket guarantee was best under the circumstances, and an early 
resumption of limited guarantee shows a speedy resolution of financial crisis. 
 
 
Table 8-4: KDIC financial support to Banks (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
Banks 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
KFB 7500 42086 - - 4459 3600 - 31197 33536
Hanvit 32642 - 27644 - - - - - -
Seoul 7500 33201 6108 - - - - - -
CHB - 27179 - - - - - - -
Peace - 2200 2730 - - - - - -
Kyungnam - - 2590 - - - - - -
Kwangju - - 1704 - - - - - -
Cheju - - 531 - - - - - -
Kookmin 2000 - - 10651 7534 120 - 179 -
H&CB 2965 - - 6812 11008 175 - 538 -
Shinhan 2925 - - 15376 9226 589 - 591 -
Hana - 4728 - 7739 3400 22 - 54 -
KorAm 2600 - - 17212 4111 33 - 226 -
KDB - - - - - - - - 13000
IBK - - - - - - - - 6000
TOTAL 58132 109394 41307 57790 42738 4539 32785 52536
source: KDIC Annual Report, various issues.  
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Table 8-4 (cont'd): KDIC financial support to Banks (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
Banks 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003



















TOTAL 12543 - 662 31190 547 942 5961 6654 4561




Table 8-5: KDIC financial support to Insurance Companies (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
Institutions 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Korea life - 20500 - - 2368 587 - - -
Doowon - 300 - - - - - - -
S K -- --- 5 0 6 - - 2 7 9
Kookmin - 2862 - - - - - - 168
handuck -2 3 2 7 1 0 2 3- - - - - -
Hyundai - - - - - 111 - - -
Chosun - 993 173 - - - - - -
Kumho - - - - - 700 - - -
Dongah - 10214 708 - - - - - 2711
D o n g y a n g -- --- 4 1 4 - --
Taepyongyang - 1751 846 - - - - - 289
Samsung - - 4329 22 - - - -
Kyobo - - - 2399 12 - - - -
Heungkook - - - 2723 69 - - - -
Jeil - - - 2084 3 - - - -
Seoul Guarantee - 12500 34000 - - - - - -
TOTAL - 51447 36750 11535 2474 2318 - - 3447
source: KDIC Annual Report, various issues.  
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Table 8-5 (cont'd): KDIC financial support to Insurance Companies (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Contribution Asset Purchase
Institutions 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Korea life 15000 7560 236 48
Daehan Cement 0.5 380 129
KunWha Pharmaceutical 0.5









Acq. Of Regent Fire 2386
Green Cross Life 1393
71000.5 0.5 0 9561 868 4052 0 0 48





Table 8-6: KDIC financial support to Securities Companies (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Insurance Claim Payment
Institutions 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Jangeun Securities - - - 40 - -
Dongbang Peregrine Sec. - - - 100 - -
Hannam I & S - - - - 1 -
Korea Industrial Sec. - - - - 3 -
Korea Investment Trust - - 30000 - - -
Daehan Investment Trust - - 19000 - - -
TOTAL - - 49000 140 4 -
source: KDIC Annual Report, various issues.  89
 
 
Table 8-7 (cont'd): KDIC financial support to Merchant Banks (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Loan
Institutions 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
Woori Investment Bank 647*
Kumho Merchant Bank
Hanbui Merchant Bank
0 0 647 0 0 0
source: KDIC Annual Report, various issues.
*Due to Woori Investment Bank's transferal of assets and liabilities to Woori Bank.  
 
Table 8-7: KDIC financial support to Merchant Banks (100 million of Won)
Names of  Equity Participation Loan
Institutions 1998 1999 2000 Prior to 1999 1999 2000
Chungsol 121 - - 1275 - -
Saehan - - - 4238 - -
Hangil - - - 1139 - -
Daegu - - - 502 - -
Asia - - - 300 - -
Kumho - - - 375 - -
Dongyang - - - 1200 - -
Soolsan - - - 200 - -
Hyundai - - - 505 - -
Hanwoi - - - 531 - -
Samyang - - - 250 - -
Jeil - - - 1118 - -
Youngnam - - 1717 370 - -
Korea - - 0.5 914 - -
Hans - - 0.5 - - -
Joongang - - 0.5 - - -
Hanaro - - 12889 - - -
HBC 300 - - 126821 - 13447
TOTAL 421 - 14608 139738 - 13447
source: KDIC Annual Report, various issues.  90
9. Summary and conclusion   
As we have documented, the Korean financial sector did have problems even 
before the Asian currency crisis. Over-borrowing from foreign banks, 
over-extension of businesses by chaebols, and easy-lending to those chaebol 
projects, were all obvious from the data dated before July 1997, at least with 
benefits of hindsight. However, the downfall of the currency and the 
macroeconomy was more than what Korea and its financial sector deserved 
from careless lending before the crisis. This was the case that Korea was hit 
by a severe liquidity crisis in November and December 1997.  The sharp 
depreciation of the currency shook the fragile financial sector badly.  Many 
banks and financial institutions became insolvent and failed due to the 
currency depreciation, macroeconomy downturn, and nonperforming loans.     
   
Bank restructuring in Korea, in response to the severe difficulties of the 
financial institutions worked out relatively successful. Although 
restructuring required a substantial amount of resources in fiscal fund 
injections, the banking sector recovered quickly, compared to that in other 
crisis-hit countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan.  Drastic 
measure of closing down banks, nationalization, and forcing privatization 
and mergers, did do the trick—making surviving banks stronger. KAMCO 
completed its role to purchase NPLs from financial institutions in November 
2002 and entered the new phase, not only working out and auctioning off 
NPLs but also increasing international competitiveness and improving 
efficiency in the banking sector.       
 
However, there are still some challenges. The consolidation of banks and 
merchant banks has dramatically progressed, but the number of Non-banks, 
such as mutual savings and credit unions, has not decreased significantly. 
The number of securities companies have even increased.  
 
Similarly, NPL ratios of banks have decreased, NPL ratios of other financial 
institutions have remained rather high.    Public assistance through KAMCO 
in purchasing NPLs and KDIC in capital injection has relied on banks, and 
surviving merchant banks and other non-banks have not benefited by the 
government restructuring program. The Non-bank sector is still vulnerable.   
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Institutional reform, creating and reinforcing KAMCO and KDIC, has 
worked well. The sales of assets from KAMCO had the initial problem, but 
did proceed smoothly afterwards.  Inviting foreign capital as a partner did 
speed up the process of bank restructuring. KAMCO’s outright sales of NPL 
resulted in lower prices than the fair value. Profit sharing was introduced in 
the form of equity partnership later.   
 
The FSC’s role can be strengthened as a unified supervisory agency. The 
division of roles among FSC, KAMCO, and KDIC should be clarified once the 
crisis management is over.   
 
After all, bank restructuring in Korea in the aftermath of the Asian currency 
crisis is almost over. The focus of government-led bank restructuring will be 
shifted to create market-oriented reform, to ensure peace-time operation, 
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